

# Monetary Policy and Fragility in Corporate Bond Funds

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## Abstract

We document aggregate outflows from corporate bond funds days before and after the announcement of increases in the Federal Funds Target rate (FFTar). To rationalize this phenomenon, we build a model in which funds' net-asset-values (NAVs) are stale and investors strategically redeem to profit from the mispricing when they learn about the increases of FFTar. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that stale NAVs and loose monetary policy environments weaken (strengthen) outflows sensitivity to increases in FFTar during illiquid (liquid) market conditions. Our results highlight when and how monetary policy could systematically exacerbate the fragility of corporate bond funds.

*Keywords:* monetary policy, corporate bond mutual funds, fund redemption, financial fragility, market liquidity

*JEL code:* E52, G14, G23

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# 1 Introduction

Researchers have found that monetary policy has a significant impact on asset prices, credit allocations, and stability in the banking sector.<sup>1</sup> In this paper, we show that increases in the Federal Funds Target rate (FFTar) are associated with sizeable outflows from non-bank financial intermediaries, specifically corporate bond mutual funds. A useful comparison to assess the economic significance of this phenomenon is the deposit channel of monetary policy (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2017). Like banks, corporate bond funds engage in liquidity transformation by holding long-term assets while issuing demandable claims to investors. As of 2020, the size of corporate bond funds has grown to 3 trillion United States Dollars, approximately one-third of bank deposits (see Figure 1). Notably, the sensitivity of fund outflows to changes in FFTar is *thrice* that of bank deposits (see Table 3). These stylized facts raise concerns regarding corporate bond funds' fragility, the potential illiquidity spillovers to financial markets, and the negative impact on credit supply to the broader economy when monetary policy tightens.<sup>2</sup>

To capture the driving forces behind this phenomenon, henceforth the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity, we propose a mechanism based on the stale pricing of fund shares. We argue that *expected* increases in FFTar lead to temporary overpricing of fund shares around the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, inducing investors to redeem their shares. We empirically identify the above mechanism by conducting an event study in a narrow window around FOMC meetings using daily flow data. Our analysis comprises four key steps. First, we establish that changes in FFTar can be anticipated several days prior to the meetings by utilizing information embedded in the 30-day Fed Funds Future rates or 30-day Eurodollar Future rates. Second, we confirm that the prices of many fund shares, i.e., net-asset values (NAVs), are stale and do not immediately

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<sup>1</sup> For example, monetary policy is shown to affect equity and credit risk premia, Treasury term premia, leverage, and risk-taking choices by financial intermediaries. See the surveys by Kashyap and Stein (2023) and Bauer, Bernanke, and Milstein (2023).

<sup>2</sup> Ma, Xiao, and Zeng (2022a) quantify the liquidity transformation of bond mutual funds relative to bank deposits. Massa, Yasuda, and Zhang (2013); Zhu (2021) show that corporate bond mutual funds matter for credit supply, and Fang (2022) quantifies the magnitude of the monetary policy transmission mechanism via corporate bond funds. Bond funds have exhibited significant fragility during the bond market disruption in the Covid-19 crisis (Falato, Goldstein, and Hortaçsu, 2021; Haddad, Moreira, and Muir, 2021; Kargar et al., 2021). The Federal Reserve intervened and stabilized the market by creating corporate credit facilities (O'Hara and Zhou, 2021; Boyarchenko, Kovner, and Shachar, 2022; Gilchrist et al., 2020).

update in light of new information.<sup>3</sup> In a similar spirit to [Choi, Kronlund, and Oh \(2022\)](#), we proxy staleness by the proportion of trading days with non-moving NAVs and find that the median value is 27%. Third, we show that stale NAVs adjust downwards slowly as a response to the anticipated increases in FFTar, reaching full adjustment approximately one week after the meetings. This indicates that the fund shares are temporarily overpriced, particularly within a 10-day window around FOMC meetings. Fourth, we find evidence consistent with the notion that investors strategically redeem their shares to profit from the temporarily overpricing: *predicted* changes in FFTar are positively correlated with outflows *before* and *after* the meetings, with a significantly stronger outflow response observed for funds with high staleness.

We provide further supportive evidence for our mispricing mechanism in Section 2.4. We find no significant outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar relationship in Treasury funds, equity funds, and index corporate bond funds. This set of negative results is consistent with our mispricing mechanism because the NAVs of these funds are much less stale than those of corporate bond mutual funds. It also discounts alternative channels in which monetary policy affects flows of fixed-income funds as a whole and causes aggregate portfolio reallocation to other assets such as equities. In addition, we show that our results are not driven by the reaching-for-yield channel as documented in [Choi and Kronlund \(2017\)](#). Overall, our analyses, which includes the event study approach and cross-sectional analysis, lend strong support to our mispricing mechanism. It is worth noting that our emphasis on *predictable* components in the changes in FFTar distinguishes our paper from other research in the literature which studies unexpected changes or news revealed in monetary policy announcements.

The magnitude of the outflow response, reported as a percentage of funds’ total net assets, is economically significant: a 25-basis-point increase in the predicted changes in FFTar is, on average, associated with a 0.231% increase in outflows during a four-day window before FOMC meetings. This effect size is more than half of the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity estimated using monthly data. In other words, our proposed mechanism can explain at least 50% of the observed

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<sup>3</sup> NAVs are stale because their daily calculations are based on transaction prices of the corporate bonds, which might not reflect recent news since most bonds are traded less than once a day. For instance, [Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner \(2014\)](#) show that from October 2004 to December 2008, the mean trading interval of corporate bonds is 4.46 days. The 5<sup>th</sup> percentile is 1.5 days.

monthly relationship between outflows and increases in FFTar.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the effect size of high-staleness funds is significantly larger: a 0.291% outflow within a four-day window preceding FOMC meetings in response to a 25-basis-point increase in the predicted FFTar. This effect is comparable to the 0.3% weekly outflows observed in bond funds during the COVID-19 period, as documented by Falato, Goldstein, and Hortaçsu (2021).

Besides mispricing in NAVs, redeeming investors also impose costs on staying investors when fund managers liquidate assets at a cost to meet redemption demands. The liquidation cost of assets, or, market illiquidity, thus intensifies the redemption externalities and has been shown to exacerbate outflows when funds underperform (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2010; Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng, 2017). In our analyses, we also find that illiquidity strengthens the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTAr sensitivity.

While both staleness in NAVs and illiquidity strengthen our proposed mechanism, do they interact and if so, how? In terms of policy implications, is it always a good idea to reduce staleness? Also, under what monetary policy environment is the mechanism more relevant? To answer these questions, we build a model of strategic redemption by fund investors in the face of an uncertain interest rate policy. In the model, upon receiving signals regarding the future interest rate and hence the updated intrinsic values of bond funds, fund investors choose between redeeming the fund at the NAV and staying in the fund. In equilibrium, investors redeem when the ratio of NAV to the intrinsic fund value is above a certain threshold. The likelihood of such an event represents the notion of fund fragility and is empirically proxied by the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTAr sensitivity. The model yields two additional hypotheses which, to the best of our knowledge, are novel in the literature. We find strong empirical support for both hypotheses.

The first novel hypothesis is that staleness in NAV weakens (strengthens) the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTAr sensitivity when liquidity is low (high). That is, surprisingly, staleness could stabilize outflows in times of market distress. We illustrate the intuition behind this hypothesis with an example. Suppose the initial bond fund share value is \$100 and due to staleness, NAV will adjust half way to the updated fund value. When liquidity is high, investors are not concerned with others' redemption

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<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that this effect size does not capture the full impact of our mechanism. As shown in Table 5, the mispricing of staler funds persists for at least five days after the FOMC meetings. If we consider the 10-day window where mispricing is present, then a 25-basis-point increase in the predicted changes in FFTar is, on average, associated with a 0.391% increase in outflows.

and behave more like arbitrageurs. They redeem when the updated fund value drops below, say, \$96, thus, when the NAV is below \$98 ( $= \frac{\$100+\$96}{2}$ ). By definition, NAVs with higher staleness adjust less and stays closer to the initial value \$100. In this case, NAV with higher staleness means more *overpriced* fund shares, triggering more outflows. In contrast, when liquidity is low, investors are so concerned with others' redemption that they redeem whenever the fund value drops below, say, \$104. In this case, the NAV is \$102 and higher staleness in NAV means more *underpriced* NAV, reducing investors' incentives to redeem. Therefore, staleness acts as a *stabilizing* force during periods of distress. Empirical tests provide support for this prediction: high-staleness funds experience 12-30% *less* outflows compared to low-staleness funds in the context of illiquid funds or illiquid market conditions. These findings can explain why fund managers, who exercise some discretion over the determination of NAVs, might want to keep some staleness in the first place.

The second novel hypothesis is that the outflow- $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity is weaker (stronger) in a low-interest-rate environment when liquidity is low (high). Using the example discussed above, when liquidity is high, investors act like arbitrageurs and overpricing in NAVs induces outflows. When liquidity is low, investors are predisposed to redeem and are only stopped by enough underpricing in the NAVs. Since a low-interest rate environment enhances bond duration and thus potential mispricing in NAVs, it encourages (discourages) outflows when liquidity is high (low). Consistent with this hypothesis, we find a strong outflow- $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity in months characterized by accommodative monetary policy and liquid market conditions. However, during stressed periods or for illiquid funds, capital flows out from funds more aggressively in response to FFTar increases when monetary policy is tight.

Taking stock of the results, our paper highlights a *monetary policy-induced fragility* in corporate bond mutual funds due to their stale NAVs. We have argued that our proposed mechanism carries economically sizable effects. In terms of policy implications, there are two novel messages. First, policies that aim to reduce staleness in NAVs could backfire and lead to *more* fragility during market distress. More generally, our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between staleness and market illiquidity and of studying their interaction. Second, when increasing interest rates, policymakers should also consider the potential destabilizing effect on corporate bond funds,

especially during market distress in a tight monetary policy regime.

**Related Literature.** Our paper belongs to the literature on the fragility of open-end mutual funds. [Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang \(2010\)](#) use a model to show that redemption leads to asset liquidation and that the associated cost is borne by remaining investors. Thus, redemption externalities lead to a first-mover advantage in investors' redemption decisions, resulting in large outflows in response to poor fund performance. [Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang \(2010\)](#) and [Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng \(2017\)](#) empirically find such outflow-to-poor-performance sensitivity in equity and corporate bond funds and, consistent with the theory, the sensitivity is exacerbated by asset illiquidity.<sup>5</sup> In addition, [Choi, Kronlund, and Oh \(2022\)](#) show that stale pricing in corporate bond funds' NAV can also intensify the flow-performance sensitivity. While prior research focuses on performance-induced fragility at the individual fund level, our paper contributes to this literature by showing that monetary policy combined with stale pricing is a source of *aggregate* fund fragility. Our paper also finds that staleness *reduces* fragility when liquidity is low, highlighting a novel stabilizing effect of staleness.

[Feroli et al. \(2014\)](#), [Banegas, Montes-Rojas, and Siga \(2016\)](#), and more recently, [Fang \(2022\)](#) have documented the relationship between monetary policy and corporate bond fund flows. Our contributions relative to this literature are two-fold. First, we provide a theoretical model of the mechanism based on stale pricing of NAVs which allows us to make novel predictions about the situations in which the mechanism will be strongest. Second, with daily and monthly data, our empirical analysis tightly identifies the mechanism, shows that our mechanism can explain a substantial part of the observed outflow- $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity, and supports the model predictions.

Our paper also contributes to the recent growing literature on the destabilizing effects of monetary policy on financial intermediaries. [Adrian and Liang \(2018\)](#) provide a survey. [Adrian and Shin \(2008\)](#) and [Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl \(2018\)](#) show that an accommodative monetary policy allows intermediaries to take higher leverage, pushing up asset prices. [Di Maggio and Kacperczyk \(2017\)](#), [Choi and Kronlund \(2017\)](#) and [Ivashina and Becker \(2015\)](#) document reaching-

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<sup>5</sup> [Schmidt, Timmermann, and Wermers \(2016\)](#) document similar run dynamics in money market mutual funds during the financial crisis in 2008. [Jin et al. \(2022\)](#) use U.K. corporate bond fund data to show that swing pricing can mitigate the first-mover advantage and outflows during market distress.

for-yield behavior of money market funds, corporate bond mutual funds, and insurance companies respectively.<sup>6</sup> Our paper emphasizes a mispricing mechanism specific to corporate bond funds and shows that under both tight and loose monetary policy environments, increases in the policy rate could lead to fragility. Overall, we highlight another unintended consequence of monetary policy.

## 2 Monetary Policy Changes and Flows to Corporate Bond Mutual Funds

In this section, we begin by presenting a strong correlation between monetary policy changes and flows to corporate bond mutual funds. We then provide evidence to support our mispricing channel, which suggests that stale pricing of fund shares around FOMC meetings play a significant role in explaining the observed relationship between interest rates and fund outflows.

### 2.1 Data

The target federal funds rate (FFTar) set by the U.S. Federal Reserve is downloaded from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).<sup>7</sup> We also download the dates of FOMC meetings from the [Federal Reserve](#). The daily data for the 30-day Federal Funds Futures is obtained from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group, while the data for the 30-day Eurodollar Futures is downloaded from Bloomberg. The data pertaining to corporate bond mutual funds are sourced from two databases, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database, and the Morningstar Direct database.

Our study begins by utilizing the CRSP mutual fund database, as outlined in [Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng \(2017\)](#), to generate a comprehensive sample of corporate bond mutual funds. We identify corporate bond mutual funds based on their objective codes provided by CRSP, and apply filters

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<sup>6</sup> [Cetorelli, La Spada, and Santos \(2022\)](#) find that monetary policy surprises affect flows in loan funds.

<sup>7</sup> Before 2008, the FFTar series, [DFEDTAR](#) of FRED, is used. After 2008, a target rate corridor is introduced, we average the upper limit, [DFEDTARU](#), and lower limit, [DFEDTARL](#), as the FFTar.

to enhance data quality.<sup>8</sup> Our analysis focuses on the fund shares and encompasses detailed fund characteristics, such as expense ratio, maturity, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and a high-yield fund indicator.<sup>9</sup> We also obtain the daily NAVs of the fund shares from the CRSP mutual funds database, which is used to calculate daily fund returns

To obtain daily flow information at the fund-share level, we merge the Morningstar Direct and CRSP databases using ticker information, as described in [Berk and Van Binsbergen \(2015\)](#).<sup>10</sup> Morningstar began collecting self-reported total net assets (TNAs) from funds in July 2007. However, daily TNAs are reported at the discretion of the funds, leading to inconsistency in reporting frequency. For example, as pointed out by [Zitzewitz \(2003\)](#); [Greene and Hodges \(2002\)](#); [Goetzmann, Ivković, and Rouwenhorst \(2001\)](#); [Choi, Kronlund, and Oh \(2022\)](#), some funds report daily TNAs including same-day flows, while others report pre-same-day flow TNAs. To mitigate the potential errors resulting from inconsistent reporting, our analysis employs cumulative flows in a window of at least five days around FOMC meetings. Our final sample spans from January 2009 to December 2019, and contains 2,697 unique fund shares.<sup>11</sup>

Table 2 provides summary statistics for daily data in Panel A and monthly data in Panel B. The tables show that capital flows into corporate bond mutual funds during both sample periods, with an average daily inflow of 0.04% of TNA between 2009 and 2019 and an average monthly inflow of 0.9% from 1992 to 2019. Although the sample periods differ, the two magnitudes are largely consistent. Additionally, corporate bond mutual funds generate positive returns, with an average

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<sup>8</sup> A mutual fund share is considered as a corporate bond fund share if 1) its Lipper objective code in the set ('A', 'BBB', 'HY', 'SII', 'SID', 'IID'), or 2) its Strategic Insight Objective code in the set ('CGN', 'CHQ', 'CHY', 'CIM', 'CMQ', 'CPR', 'CSM'), or 3) its Wiesenberger objective code in the set ('CBD', 'CHY'), or 4) its CRSP objective code starts with 'IC'. In addition, we limit our sample to fund shares with at least one-year history in the sample period. We also eliminate fund share-month entries without return or total net asset (TNA) information, as well as entries with a TNA increase or decrease of more than 100% over a month. Additionally, we exclude exchange-traded funds and exchange-traded notes from our analysis. Data on corporate bond mutual funds is limited prior to 1991 and thus excluded from our analysis. Additionally, we calculate the performance of each bond fund share using one year of data, and hence the final data spans from January 1992 to December 2019.

<sup>9</sup> A mutual fund share is considered as a high-yield fund share if 1) its Lipper objective code is 'HY' or 'HM', or 2) its Strategic Insight Objective code is 'CHY', or 3) its Wiesenberger objective code is 'CHY', or 4) its CRSP objective code is 'ICQY'.

<sup>10</sup> We keep only bond fund shares that appear in the corporate bond fund sample constructed using the CRSP database and have consecutive daily flows to construct cumulative flows around FOMC meetings.

<sup>11</sup> There are less than 80 funds shares left before July 2008. The fund shares increased to 1,500 in July 2008 and kept increasing afterward. To ensure sufficient data coverage and reliability, we keep the sample from January 2009.



return of roughly 0.4% per month for both daily and monthly samples. The other reported statistics at the monthly level are consistent with Table 1 in [Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng \(2017\)](#).

## 2.2 Aggregate Facts

In this section, we document a strong correlation between monetary policy changes and flows to corporate bond funds, and draw comparisons with the impact of monetary policy on the banking sector.

Panel B of [Figure 1](#) displays the annual change in the Federal Fund Target rate represented by the green line, alongside the flows to corporate bond funds in red. The plot reveals a distinct pattern whereby corporate bond funds experience significant outflows (inflows) during periods of monetary tightening (easing), with the exception of the Financial Crisis periods. The blue line of Panel B plots the annual change in mutual funds' holdings of corporate bonds issued by non-financial corporate businesses.<sup>12</sup> These holdings exhibit a strong comovement with the flows to corporate bond mutual funds. This comovement suggests that the effects of monetary policy can be transmitted through corporate bond mutual funds, impacting not only the bond funds themselves but credit availability in the real economy (see also [Fang \(2022\)](#)).

To evaluate the economic significance of corporate bond fund flow sensitivity to monetary policy, we compare it with the deposit flow sensitivity to monetary policy documented by [Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl \(2017\)](#). We regress annual (or monthly) outflows from corporate bond mutual funds and, respectively, deposit withdrawals from all commercial banks on FFTar changes. Following [Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl \(2017\)](#), we consider the withdrawals of both total deposits and core deposits, which include small time, demand, and other checkable deposits. In addition, we include several macroeconomic variables as controls, such as changes in the term structure of interest rates (measured by the difference in yield between 30-year and 1-year Treasury bonds), changes in default risk (measured by the difference in yield between BBB- and AAA-rated corporate bonds), and changes in bond market illiquidity (approximated by changes in the VIX index), all

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<sup>12</sup> The series is constructed using flow and asset of mutual funds' holdings in corporate bonds issued by nonfinancial corporate businesses (BOGZ1FA653063043Q and BOGZ1FL653063043Q) in the FRED database.

extracted from FRED. The sample spans from January 1992 to December 2019 and the regression specification is as follows:

$$\text{Annual Outflow}_t = \Delta\text{FFTar}_t + \text{Controls} + \varepsilon_t. \quad (1)$$

We find that flows in corporate bond funds are at least three times more responsive to increases in FFTar than deposit flows. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. The first three columns focus on annual flows: a 25-basis-point increase in FFTar is associated with a 1.55% annual outflow from corporate bond mutual funds, which is more than three times larger than the effect observed for core deposits in commercial banks. The monthly results are even more pronounced, with a 25-basis-point increase in FFTar associated with a 0.276% monthly outflow from corporate bond mutual funds, corresponding to an annual flow of 3.315%. Given that the TNA of corporate bond funds have grown to approximately one-third of total deposits in commercial banks, these findings underscore the economic significance of corporate bond funds in monetary policy transmission.

## 2.3 Mechanism

To explain the outflow– $\Delta\text{FFTar}$  relationship in corporate bond funds, we propose a mechanism that relies on three premises. First, changes in FFTar are predictable. Second, the NAVs of corporate bond funds are stale. Third, as stale NAVs do not fully respond to market information, future changes in NAVs around FOMC meetings are predictable. The mechanism then works as follows: When investors anticipate an impending increase (decrease) in the FFTar, they withdraw (deposit) capital from (to) corporate bond funds around FOMC meetings in order to profit from the stale pricing and, hence, temporary mispricing of fund shares. As a result, fund outflows around FOMC meetings and changes in the FFTar are positively correlated.

Below, we first present empirical evidence supporting these three premises. Then, we show evidence consistent with strategic redemption by fund investors. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our findings to various alternative hypotheses.

### 2.3.1 NAV Mispricing around FOMC Meetings

**Premise 1: Changes in FFTar are predictable.** We follow [Cochrane and Piazzesi \(2002\)](#) and examine the predictive power of market-traded derivatives on FFTar in forecasting changes during forthcoming FOMC meetings. Specifically, we study the Federal Funds Futures and the Eurodollar Futures and we employ the following predictive regression model:

$$\Delta FFTar_{[-1,1]} = \Delta Futures_{(\tau+5,-1)} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (2)$$

where  $\Delta FFTar_{[-1,1]}$  represents the change in FFTar announced at each FOMC meeting (date 0). We examine the changes in the Future rates that occur between meetings within a window of  $(\tau+5, -1]$ , where  $\tau$  refers to the date of the preceding FOMC meeting. We choose the window  $(\tau+5, -1]$  instead of  $(\tau, -1]$  to allow the Futures to respond to the news revealed in the preceding FOMC meeting.

The regression results are presented in Panel A of [Table 4](#).  $\Delta FFuture$  and  $\Delta Eurodollar$  denote changes in the Fed Funds Future rates and the Eurodollar Future rates respectively. The positive and significant coefficients indicate that the Future rate changes before the meetings have strong predictive power, both in the full sample and in the sub-sample after the financial crisis. In the full sample, both market-traded derivatives are able to explain over 30% of the variations in future FFTar changes. Furthermore, they accurately predicted the direction of FFTar changes in 58 out of 68 meetings where actual changes in FFTar occurred. These findings are visually represented in [Figure A1](#), which displays the paired dots representing the Future rate changes and FFTar changes.

In the period following the financial crisis, the Eurodollar Future rates demonstrate exceptional predictive power for future FFTar changes, with an  $R^2$  value of 68.2%. In addition, the predicted changes closely align with the actual changes, with a 1% increase in Eurodollar Future rates preceding the meeting corresponding to a 1.03% increase in the announced FFTar. We also note that all 12 meetings with announced FFTar changes are correctly predicted. These findings are consistent with the notion that central banks have increasingly utilized public communications to shape market expectations regarding future policy actions, as emphasized in prior research ([Blinder et al., 2008](#); [Bernanke, 2010](#)). Given the stronger predictive power observed in the Eurodollar

Futures after 2009, our subsequent analysis will rely on the prices of this contract.

**Premise 2: NAVs of corporate bond funds are stale.** Next, we present evidence that the NAVs of some corporate bond funds do not fully react to the information revealed by market derivatives before FOMC meetings. NAVs are likely to be stale because their daily calculations are based on transaction prices of the corporate bonds the funds hold. These transaction prices might not reflect recent news since most bonds are traded less than once a day. [Choi, Kronlund, and Oh \(2022\)](#) find significant autocorrelation in returns of bond funds, consistent with the staleness hypothesis. It is worth noting that investors cannot easily profit from these stale prices through trading the underlying bonds because dealers would update their quotes based on public information when quotes are requested.

We proxy the staleness of bond fund NAVs with the proportion of days in which the NAV does not change in the period leading up to each FOMC meeting. This measure is obtained by dividing the number of trading days in which NAVs do not change from the previous trading day by the total number of trading days between  $(\tau + 5, -1]$ , where  $\tau$  represents the date of the preceding FOMC meeting. [Figure 2](#) plots the distributions of the staleness measures for corporate bond and equity funds. The plots clearly show that corporate bond funds have much higher staleness than equity funds. On average, the staleness measure for corporate bond funds is 0.33, implying that their NAVs do not move in 33% of the days preceding FOMC meetings.

In all the analyses, we use a one-meeting lag of the staleness measure to mitigate concerns about overlapping the measurement and the estimation windows.<sup>13</sup> We classify funds with a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days than the median in the non-FOMC window before the preceding FOMC meeting as high- (low-)staleness funds. In [Table A1](#), we observe that high-staleness funds have lower average holdings of cash and government bonds, a shorter maturity, and a lower likelihood of being high-yield funds compared to low-staleness funds. However, there are no significant differences between high-staleness and low-staleness funds in terms of fund size, age, and the likelihood of being primarily held by institutional investors.

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<sup>13</sup> Our results also hold when we use the staleness measure without the lag.

**Premise 3: Changes in NAVs are predictable.** If NAVs are stale and thus do not incorporate public information promptly, changes in Eurodollar Futures, which as argued above contain information about future changes in FF<sub>Tar</sub>, should predict future changes in NAV. We test this conjecture with the following predictive regression:

$$\Delta NAV_{i,(t_1,t_2]} = \Delta \text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,t_1]} + \text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,d}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\Delta NAV_{i,(t_1,t_2]}$  represents the logarithmic changes in the NAV of fund share  $i$  within the time windows  $(t_1, t_2]$  surrounding FOMC meetings. The analysis examines the changes in NAVs within four distinct time windows surrounding FOMC meetings:  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ . These time windows are carefully chosen to ensure there is no overlap with preceding or subsequent FOMC meetings.

Moreover, we include fund share fixed effects denoted by  $\alpha_i$ . We also incorporate control variables denoted as  $\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$ , which are the lagged fund characteristics from one year prior, including the logarithm of total net assets, expense ratios, the percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and an indicator variable for high-yield funds. The inclusion of these control variables addresses concerns that the results may be driven by factors other than the staleness of NAVs. To assess the overall impact on the aggregate bond fund sector, we assign weights to each observation based on the fund's TNA value from the previous year. Standard errors are clustered at both the FOMC meeting and fund share levels to account for potential heteroscedasticity and correlation within these groups.

The regression results are presented in Table 5. Panel A contains results for high-staleness funds and Panel B contains results for low-staleness funds. Columns 1-2 study the contemporaneous relationship between changes in NAVs and the Eurodollar Future rates in the window  $(\tau+5,-5]$ . The results are intuitive: the NAVs of both high-staleness and low-staleness funds decrease when Eurodollar Future rates increase.

The more important question is whether the information embedded in the Eurodollar Futures can predict future changes in NAVs. Columns 3-4 show that starting from 5 days before FOMC meetings, only NAVs of high-staleness funds continue to respond significantly to past changes in the

Eurodollar Future rates. This adjustment persists for 5 days after the meeting (as shown in columns 5-6). Such a relationship no longer exists after this 5-day period. These findings suggest that NAVs of high-staleness funds do not fully incorporate the information revealed in the Eurodollar Futures until 5 days after the meeting. Meanwhile, Panel B shows a rather different picture for low-staleness funds. Their NAVs incorporate much of the pre-FOMC information: Starting from 5 days before meetings, NAVs are marginally associated with the past changes in Eurodollar Future rates. All of the aforementioned results remain robust even when we control for potential information for monetary policy in the longer horizon, proxied by longer-maturity Treasury yields, as shown in Table A2.

Overall, these findings highlight the delayed and incomplete adjustments observed in high-staleness funds, indicating that their shares are temporarily mispriced, particularly within a 10-day window around FOMC meetings.

### **2.3.2 Investor Flows in Response to NAVs Mispricing**

Opportunistic investors could exploit the temporary overpricing (underpricing) by redeeming their shares (depositing funds) before NAVs are fully adjusted. To investigate this phenomenon, we employ the same specification as described in Equation (3), but with cumulative daily flows as the dependent variable within the time windows of (-5,-1], (-1,5], and (5,15] around FOMC meetings.

The regression results are presented in Table 6. In the first six columns, we find a robust positive relationship between changes in the Eurodollar rate and outflows from corporate bond funds (as a percentage of TNA). This relationship is particularly pronounced for high-staleness funds, for which, as argued above, the NAVs have not fully incorporated the market information. In terms of magnitude, a 25-basis-point increase in the Eurodollar Future rates is associated with a 0.797%  $((1.164+2.023)/4)$  increase in fund outflows for high-staleness funds in the 10-day window surrounding FOMC meetings. This effect is almost double the effect observed for low-staleness funds, which is around 0.421%  $((0.704+0.981)/4)$  in the same window. This magnitude is also economically significant, as the 0.797% outflows translate to approximately 23 billion USD when benchmarked to the total size of corporate bond mutual funds in 2019.

The last three columns show that the relationship between outflows and the Eurodollar rate remains significant even 5 days after the FOMC meeting. However, in this window, there is no longer a distinction between high-staleness and low-staleness funds, indicating that the outflows driven by mispricing dissipate within 5 days after the FOMC meeting. This finding aligns with the results presented in Table 5, which show that NAVs fully incorporate information about FFTar changes within the first 5 days following the meetings.

The significant outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar relationship in the (5, 15] window, where changes in NAVs are no longer predictable, also suggests that our mispricing mechanism alone cannot fully explain the relationship between interest rates and fund outflows. However, we argue that our mechanism accounts for at least 50% of this relationship. Table 7 compares the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity estimated using daily and monthly data for the same sample. The results show that, on average, a 25-basis-point increase in the anticipated changes in FFTar is associated with a 0.231% increase in outflows during the window (-5, 1], which is more than half of the coefficient size estimated using monthly data (Column 6). When considering the outflows in the window (-5, 5], our proposed mechanism explains 87% (1.562/1.794) of the monthly effect.

**Sharper Identification.** We choose the same window ( $\tau+5,-5$ ] for each FOMC meeting to make the analyses consistent. However, this introduces noise in our estimation because the stale pricing mechanism should begin on the date when the market learns about the impending interest rate changes. In order to sharpen the estimation, we identify this date as the earliest date before each FOMC meeting where the daily change in the Eurodollar Futures exceeds the 95th percentile of the sample. We denote this date as  $\tau'$  and then estimate the mechanism in the subsequent 10 days. In our sample, there are 44 FOMC meetings where substantial variations in market rates occurred prior to the meetings.

In Panel B of Table 4, we confirm that changes in the Eurodollar Future rates within the 10-day window following  $\tau'$  (but before FOMC meetings) provide substantial information about future FFTar changes. The adjusted  $R^2$  is 0.623.

The results are presented in Table 8. In Panel A, we find that the NAVs of high-staleness

funds do not adjust much — even contemporaneously — and investors exploit the mispricing by redeeming their shares. On the other hand, Panel B shows that the NAVs of low-staleness funds adjust significantly to changes in the information in the futures rates. Subsequently, there are no significant associated outflows observed. In sum, with this sharp identification in the days of news arrival, the cross-sectional analyses comparing high- and low-staleness funds provide compelling empirical evidence for our proposed mechanism.

## 2.4 Robustness Tests

**Heterogeneous Effects in Sub-Samples.** Panel A of Table A3 examines the impact of monetary policy changes on fund flows across various subsamples using daily data. The first two columns indicate that institution-oriented funds have a weaker outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity compared to retail-oriented funds. An explanation consistent with our mechanism is that institution-oriented funds are more likely to have concentrated, large owners who internalize more redemption externalities (Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng, 2017). Columns 3-4 compare index and non-index bond funds and find that the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar sensitivity is significant only for non-index funds. These results align with our mechanism because it is likely that bonds in the index are traded more frequently and hence that the NAVs of index funds are less stale.

**Reaching-for-yield Alternative.** Choi and Kronlund (2017) have shown that corporate bond mutual funds tilt their portfolios towards riskier bonds in low-interest rates regimes. They further find that investment-grade funds engage in such “reaching-for-yield” (RFY) behavior and attract more investor flows.<sup>14</sup> According to this narrative, when interest rates increase, funds do less RFY and this leads to outflows (or, less inflows).

Below we argue that it is unlikely that our mechanism is driven by RFY. First, conceptually,

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<sup>14</sup> The “reaching-for-yield” phenomenon has been documented for various institutional investors, including money market funds (La Spada, 2018; Di Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017) and insurance companies (Ivashina and Becker, 2015). A theoretical argument for institutional investors’ engagement in reaching-for-yield behavior is the agency problem of fund managers. See Chodorow-Reich (2014); Feroli et al. (2014); Morris and Shin (2014). Recently, Lian, Ma, and Wang (2019) show that in laboratory experiments, individual investors also exhibit reaching-for-yield behaviors.



while our mechanism takes place days around FOMC meetings, tilting the weights in a bond portfolio would take weeks (Choi and Kronlund use quarterly bond holding data). Furthermore, when we conduct a sub-sample analysis in Panel B of Table A3 separately for high-yield (HY) and investment-grade (IG) funds, both types of funds experience significant outflows when the FFTar is expected to increase.<sup>15</sup> The effect is stronger for HY funds which suggests a different mechanism from Choi and Kronlund (2017) in which investor flows only respond significantly to RFY by IG funds. Lastly, we show that our results continue to hold after controlling for RFY. We do so in Table A5 by including all the variables that Choi and Kronlund have shown to predict RFY behavior as additional control variables. Interestingly, unlike the findings in Table 6, our main variable is not statistically significant in the window of (5, 15]. Meanwhile, one of the RFY predictors (30Y-1Y Treasury yields spread) is highly significant. Taken together, these results suggest that in this window where the mispricing in NAVs should have largely disappeared, the persistent effect on outflows documented in Table 6 could be attributed to the RFY narrative, which is in line with the above discussion that tilting a bond portfolio takes time.

**Monetary Policy Changes or Return Autocorrelations.** Choi, Kronlund, and Oh (2022) show that stale NAVs lead to autocorrelation in fund returns and, consequently, that daily fund flows are positively correlated with predicted returns. We argue that our findings are not solely driven by the predicted returns. Following the methodology of Choi, Kronlund, and Oh (2022), we construct Return Forecast<sub>( $\tau+5, t_2$ )</sub>, where  $\tau$  represents the date of the preceding FOMC meeting. This variable represents the predicted 5-day cumulative return based on data from  $[\tau+5, t_2]$  and is generated using an autoregressive model. We then incorporate it as a control and show that our results continue to hold (see Table A6). This result suggests that return autocorrelations do not fully capture the staleness in NAVs when news about major events such as monetary policy changes arrives.

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<sup>15</sup> Table A4 illustrates the NAV adjustment patterns surrounding FOMC meetings for both high-yield and low-yield funds. The findings are in line with the results showcased in Table 5. Across both types of funds, a consistent observation emerges: there are delayed and incomplete adjustments observed prior to FOMC meetings in high-staleness funds, suggesting that the presence of a temporary mispricing phenomenon preceding FOMC meetings.

**Placebo Tests with Treasuries and Equity Funds.** It is plausible that changes in  $FFTar$  can have a broad impact on fixed-income funds, prompting investors to rebalance their portfolios by shifting investments from corporate bonds to other asset classes. However, our analysis of Treasury and equity funds does not support these alternative mechanisms. Instead, the findings align with our mispricing mechanism.

We conduct the main analyses on Treasury and equity funds. Table A7 shows that Eurodollar Futures do not predict future changes in NAVs of Treasury funds (Panel A) or equity funds (Panel B), suggesting limited mispricing in their NAVs. Consistently, Table A8 shows that there is no significant outflow sensitivity to predicted changes in  $FFTar$  observed in either Treasury or equity funds. The lack of outflow sensitivity in these funds further supports that our stale pricing mechanism, rather than some characteristics of fixed-income products or portfolio reallocation, underpins the monetary policy-induced fragility of corporate bond funds.

### 3 Model and Hypotheses Development

Our mechanism focuses on the fund investors' decision to redeem or to stay in corporate bond funds in the face of uncertain interest rate changes. Two key features of corporate bonds make outflows responsive to interest rate changes. First, the staleness of fund NAVs results in mispricing which can be exploited by investors. Second, the illiquidity of corporate bonds implies that the liquidation of bonds triggered by redemption will be costly. Since the NAV does not reflect this future liquidation cost, investors who stay in the fund will bear the cost, inducing them to redeem in the first place. Below, we develop and analyze a model to capture these strategic considerations by fund investors. In Section 3.3, we list the model's main predictions.

#### 3.1 A Model of Fund Runs Induced by Monetary Policy

There are three dates:  $T_0$ ,  $T_1$ , and  $T_2$ . Agents are risk-neutral and consume one storable good “cash” without time-discounting. There is one asset traded in the market, namely, a zero-coupon long-term

bond (“the bond”) with a face value of \$1 maturing at  $T_2$ . We assume the bond has no credit risk so as to focus on the effect of interest rate risk.

**Monetary policy.** Monetary policy in our model is summarized by two parameters,  $r$  and  $\sigma$ , and a random variable  $\tilde{v}$ .  $r$  is the one-period (net) interest rate from  $T_0$  to  $T_1$ . It is known at  $T_0$  and represents the *tightness* of the monetary policy environment.  $r + \sigma\tilde{v}$  is the future one-period interest rate from  $T_1$  to  $T_2$ , which is unknown at  $T_0$  because the *interest rate shock*,  $\tilde{v}$ , is a random variable to be realized at  $T_1$ . We assume that  $\tilde{v}$  is drawn from a uniform distribution with zero mean, unit variance, that is,  $\tilde{v} \sim U(-\sqrt{3}, \sqrt{3})$ . The parameter  $\sigma \in \left(0, \frac{1+r}{\sqrt{3}}\right)$  captures the monetary policy uncertainty over  $T_1$  and  $T_2$ . At  $T_1$ , each investor  $i$  receive a signal  $x_i$  about the realization of  $\tilde{v}$ , denoted as  $v$ . Mapping the model into reality,  $T_1$  corresponds to the date when financial markets learn about the future policy rate set by the central bank.  $T_1$  can be days before the actual announcement at FOMC meetings.

**Investors and a Bond Mutual Fund.** There are a continuum of investors and an open-ended bond mutual fund (“the fund”). Each investor has one unit of cash invested in the fund and in return owns one share of the fund. The nature of “open-endedness” allows investors to redeem their shares at the fund’s latest net asset value (NAV) at  $T_1$ . Investors can also hold on their shares to  $T_2$  and share the fund’s asset with all the remaining investors. We assume that the fund invests all the cash received from investors in the bonds at  $T_0$ , buying  $\frac{1}{p_0}$  units of the bonds at the initial price  $p_0$ .

**Stale NAV and Market Illiquidity.** Right before  $T_1$ , i.e., before investors receive signals about  $v$ , the bond price is  $\bar{p}_1 := \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{1+r+\sigma\tilde{v}}\right]$ . After  $v$  is realized, the bond value becomes  $p_1(v) = \frac{1}{1+r+\sigma v}$ . For clarity, we will call  $p_1(v)$  the *realized* bond value and  $\frac{1}{p_0}p_1(v)$  the *intrinsic* fund value. Crucially, the NAV of the fund share is partially stale and does not fully reflect the realized bond value. We assume  $\text{NAV} := \frac{1}{p_0} \times [s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1]$ , where  $s \in (0, 1)$  is the staleness of the NAV. Indeed, a completely stale NAV behaves as if the bond values have not changed at all ( $\lim_{s \rightarrow 1} \text{NAV} = \bar{p}_1/p_0$ ) while NAV with no staleness fully reflects the realized bond values ( $\lim_{s \rightarrow 0} \text{NAV} = p_1/p_0$ ). Upon receiving information about  $v$ , or, equivalently, the realized bond values  $p_1$ , investors choose to redeem their shares at the NAV or to stay. To repay the redeeming investors, the fund needs to liquidate some bonds at the price  $\mathcal{L}p_1$ , where the exogenous liquidation discount factor,  $\mathcal{L} \in (0, 1)$ ,

reflects the liquidity of the bond market. It stems from the inventory cost of the market maker, search costs in the over-the-counter market, and bargaining power of the counterparties.

**The Redemption Game and Investors' Payoffs.** Each investor observes a private signal about the shock  $\nu$  and then individually decides whether to redeem her share or not.<sup>16</sup> The information structure will be discussed formally in Section 3.2. Redeeming investors have a claim to receive the NAV at  $T_1$  and the staying investors share the fund's remaining cash flow at  $T_2$ . In addition, we assume that staying investors derive non-monetary utility  $\psi$  (normalized by the amount of initial bond holding  $\frac{1}{p_0}$ ) if the fund is not liquidated.  $\psi > 0$  captures the unmodelled benefits of owning a diversified bond portfolio in a bond fund. Alternatively, we can interpret  $\psi$  as the additional costs borne by investors when they redeem from the fund and construct the bond portfolio by themselves. Either way, within the context of the model,  $\psi$  justifies the existence of funds so that (risk-neutral) investors cannot costlessly replicate the funds by themselves.

Table 1 summarizes the payoff of fund investors at  $T_2$ . Suppose a fraction  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$  of investors redeem. To satisfy the redemption claims  $\lambda \text{NAV}$ , the fund has to sell  $\frac{\lambda \text{NAV}}{\mathcal{L}p_1}$  units of the bond. There is enough bond and hence the fund is not completely liquidated if and only if  $\lambda \leq \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1}$ . In this case, a redeeming investor receives the NAV and re-invests the proceeds in the bond, getting a return  $\frac{1}{p_1}$ . The fund continues to hold  $\left(\frac{1}{p_0} - \frac{\lambda \text{NAV}}{\mathcal{L}p_1}\right)$  units of the bonds. The proceeds are shared among the  $(1 - \lambda)$  staying investors who also enjoy the non-pecuniary benefits of  $\psi/p_0$ . If  $\lambda > \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1}$ , the fund is completely liquidated. The total liquidation proceeds  $\frac{1}{p_0} \mathcal{L}p_1$  are shared and re-invested by the  $\lambda$  redeeming investors while staying investors receive nothing at  $T_2$ .

## 3.2 Equilibrium

Given the investors' payoffs, we are ready to characterize the investors' optimal redemption strategies and solve for the equilibrium. We first show that there exist multiple equilibria if investors observe the interest rate shock perfectly. Then, by introducing idiosyncratic noise in investors'

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<sup>16</sup> In the model, we do not allow for potential inflows of capital from new investors. This could be incorporated by assuming inflow that is an increasing function of the underpricing of fund shares, i.e., a decreasing function of  $\nu$ . This would reduce the net outflow when  $\nu$  is negative. Our mechanism should be left unchanged qualitatively.

	$\lambda \leq \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1+(1-s)p_1}$	$\lambda > \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1+(1-s)p_1}$
Redeem	$\frac{\text{NAV}}{p_1}$	$\frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{p_0^\lambda} \times \frac{1}{p_1}$
Stay	$\frac{1}{1-\lambda} \times \left( \frac{1}{p_0} - \frac{\lambda \text{NAV}}{\mathcal{L}p_1} \right) + \frac{\psi}{p_0}$	0

**Table 1: The payoff of investors at  $T_2$ .**

private signals, we characterize the unique equilibrium in which investors follow a threshold strategy. This so-called global-game technique allows us to compute the ex-ante probability of full redemption on the fund (i.e., “fund run”), which we interpret as the *fragility* of the bond fund.

### 3.2.1 Multiple Equilibria Under Perfect Signals

Suppose that right before  $T_1$ , all investors receive perfect signals about the interest rate shock  $v$ , i.e.,  $x_i = v$  for all  $i$ . Then, there are three regions in which investors’ optimal redemption strategy differs.

The first region is a high- $v$  region. When  $v \geq \bar{v}$ , redemption is the dominant strategy. That is, it is optimal for an investor to redeem even when all investors stay ( $\lambda = 0$ ). The critical value  $\bar{v}$  is implicitly defined by

$$\frac{\text{NAV}}{p_1} > \frac{1 + \psi}{p_0} \Leftrightarrow v \geq \bar{v} := \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{\psi + s}{s\bar{p}_1} - (1 + r) \right). \quad (4)$$

Intuitively, when the interest rate is high enough, or the realized bond value is low enough, redeeming the fund share at the stale NAV is very attractive. Thus, the only equilibrium is one in which all investors redeem.

Similarly, when  $v < \underline{v}$ , the realized bond value is so high that even if all other investors redeem ( $\lambda = 1$ ), the fund has enough of the bond to liquidate and repay the redeeming investors. That is,

$$\lambda = 1 < \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1} \Leftrightarrow v < \underline{v} := \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{s - (1 - \mathcal{L})}{s\bar{p}_1} - (1 + r) \right). \quad (5)$$

In this region, all investors staying is the only equilibrium.

To ensure the bounds  $\underline{\nu}$  and  $\bar{\nu}$  are within the support of interest rate shocks  $\tilde{\nu}$ , and hence the dominance regions exist, we make the following parametric assumptions.

**Assumption 1** (*Parametric assumptions*). For a given  $\{r, s\}$ ,  $\sigma \in (\underline{\sigma}, (1+r)/\sqrt{3})$ ,  $\mathcal{L} \in (\underline{\mathcal{L}}, 1)$ , and  $\psi \in (0, \bar{\psi})$ .

We derive the bounds  $\underline{\sigma}$ ,  $\underline{\mathcal{L}}$ , and  $\bar{\psi}$  in the Appendix. Importantly, in the non-empty intermediate region  $\nu \in (\underline{\nu}, \bar{\nu})$ , multiple equilibria exist. To see this, we define the payoff difference between redeeming and staying for an investor as

$$\Delta\pi(\lambda) = \begin{cases} \frac{NAV}{p_1} - \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \times \left( \frac{1}{p_0} - \frac{\lambda NAV}{\mathcal{L} p_1} \right) - \frac{\psi}{p_0} & \text{if } 0 \leq \lambda \leq \frac{\mathcal{L} p_1}{s \bar{p}_1 + (1-s) p_1} \\ \frac{\mathcal{L}}{p_0 \lambda} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

We note that when  $\nu \in [\underline{\nu}, \bar{\nu}]$ ,  $\Delta\pi(0) < 0$  and  $\Delta\pi(1) > 0$ . That is, it is optimal for an investor to redeem (stay) if all other investors redeem (stay). The following lemma summarizes the discussion.

**Lemma 1 (Multiple equilibria under perfect signals).** *If investors observe interest rate shock  $\nu$  perfectly, there exists a region  $\nu \in [\underline{\nu}, \bar{\nu}]$  in which multiple equilibria exist.*

*Proof.* See the preceding discussion. □

### 3.2.2 Global Game and Bond Fund Fragility

In order to compute the likelihood of a run on the fund and study the effect of monetary policy on this likelihood, we apply the global-game techniques and achieve a unique equilibrium in which investors follow an optimal threshold strategy. Specifically, we assume that investors receive noisy signals  $x_i$  about the realized interest rate  $\nu$  right before  $T_1$ , given by  $x_i = \nu + \varepsilon_i$ , where the signal noise  $\{\varepsilon_i\}$  is independent across investors and follows a uniform distribution with support  $[-\varepsilon, +\varepsilon]$ .<sup>17</sup>

We assume  $\varepsilon$  is positive but arbitrarily small. This allows us to invoke the standard result in the

<sup>17</sup> We follow Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) to use the information structure of uniform prior of  $\nu$  and uniform signal noise  $\varepsilon_i$ . This is for simplicity and can be relaxed to a more general distribution of prior and a noise distribution that satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property as shown in Morris and Shin (2003).

global-game literature (Morris and Shin, 2003; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all investors follow the following threshold strategy:

$$\begin{cases} \text{Redeem} & x_i > v^* \\ \text{Stay} & x_i \leq v^*. \end{cases}$$

The equilibrium threshold signal  $v^*$  is determined by the condition that the investor who has the threshold signal is indifferent between redeeming or staying. In addition, when  $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ , as explained in detail in Morris and Shin (2003), this marginal investor has a belief that the fraction of redeeming investors  $\lambda$  is uniformly distributed over  $[0, 1]$ . We can then compute the ex-ante probability of fund run, which is our notion of fragility, by using the prior distribution of the interest rate shocks  $\tilde{v}$ . We summarize these results in Proposition 1.

**Proposition 1 (Unique threshold equilibrium under incomplete information).** *There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for realization of  $v > v^*$ , all investors redeem ( $\lambda = 1$ ). For realization of  $v \leq v^*$ , all investors stay ( $\lambda = 0$ ). The threshold  $v^*$  is characterized by*

$$\frac{1}{1 + r + \sigma v^*} = \bar{p}_1 \frac{sg(\mathcal{L}, \psi)}{1 - (1 - s)g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)}, \quad (7)$$

where  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$  is the unique solution to

$$\mathcal{L} + \log(1 - \mathcal{L}g) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}g}\right) - \log(\mathcal{L}g)\mathcal{L} = 1 + \psi \mathcal{L}g. \quad (8)$$

In addition,  $g(1, 0) = 1$ ,  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}} < 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \psi} < 0$ .

*Proof.* See the Appendix 6.2 □

Proposition 1 delivers the first sharp empirical prediction on investors' equilibrium behavior—large redemption occurs when the interest rate shock is positive and large enough. We call this monetary-policy-induced fragility in bond funds. In the same spirit as Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), we interpret the ex-ante probability of the equilibrium in which all investors redeem, i.e.,  $\mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)$  as the fragility of bond funds and measure it empirically using the sensitivity of fund outflows with respect to interest rate changes.

**Definition 1.** *The fragility of the fund is defined as the probability that all investors redeem and thus the fund is fully liquidated, i.e.,  $\mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)$ .*

Equation (7) illustrates the economic forces behind the monetary-policy-induced fragility in bond funds. Using (7), the definitions of the realized bond value  $p_1(v) = \frac{1}{1+r+\sigma v}$  and NAV, all investors redeem in equilibrium if and only if  $v > v^*$ , or,<sup>18</sup>

$$\text{NAV}g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) > \frac{1}{p_0}p_1(v). \quad (9)$$

This condition says that all investors redeem and hence the fund is completely liquidated when the NAV of the fund, multiplied by a factor  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$ , is greater than the intrinsic value of the fund  $\frac{1}{p_0}p_1(v)$ . The intuition of the condition can be seen clearly in the special case in which the bond market is perfectly liquid ( $\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1$ ) and the non-pecuniary benefits of staying in the fund are negligible ( $\psi \rightarrow 0$ ). In this case,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$  becomes 1 and investors behave like arbitrageurs, redeeming the shares whenever the NAV is above the bond fund's intrinsic value.

In general,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) \neq 1$  because investors are concerned about the illiquidity of bonds and they value the benefits of staying in the fund  $\psi$ . Fix  $\psi > 0$  and consider the effect of liquidity. On one hand, when the liquidity of the bond worsens ( $\mathcal{L}$  decreases) enough,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) > 1$  and, from equation (7),  $\bar{p}_1 < p_1(v^*)$ . That is, investors redeem their shares even if the NAV is below the intrinsic value of the bond fund's share (recall  $\text{NAV} = \frac{1}{p_0}[s\bar{p}_1 + sp_1(v^*)] < \frac{1}{p_0}p_1(v^*)$ ). This is because of the redemption externalities discussed in section 3.1. When the fund has to liquidate the bond at a discount to repay the redeeming investors, investors who stay have to incur the losses. On the other hand, when liquidity is high enough,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) < 1$  and  $\bar{p}_1 > p_1(v^*)$ . In this case, investors are less concerned about redemption externalities and choose to stay even when the NAV is strictly above the intrinsic value of the bond fund's share.

Using the results in Proposition 1, we can conduct comparative static analyses to study how market illiquidity, staleness, and monetary policy environment affect fragility. This set of results forms the theoretical underpinning of the main hypotheses in Section 3.3.

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<sup>18</sup> To derive (9),  $v > v^* \Leftrightarrow p_1(v) < \frac{1}{1+r+\sigma v^*} = \bar{p}_1 \frac{sg(\mathcal{L}, \psi)}{1-(1-s)g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)} \Leftrightarrow p_1(v) < g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) \underbrace{[s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1(v)]}_{\text{NAV}p_0}$



**Corollary 1 (Fund fragility in illiquid times, stale funds, and loose monetary policy environment).** For a given  $\psi$  and  $\sigma$ ,

- a).  $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)}{\partial(-\mathcal{L})} > 0$ ;
- b).  $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)}{\partial s} > 0$  for  $\mathcal{L} \in [\tilde{\mathcal{L}}, 1]$  and  $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)}{\partial s} < 0$  otherwise;
- c).  $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)}{\partial(-r)} > 0$  for  $\mathcal{L} \in [\tilde{\mathcal{L}}, 1]$  and  $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\tilde{v} > v^*)}{\partial(-r)} < 0$  otherwise;

*Proof.* See the Appendix 6.3. □

To understand the results above, it is useful to recall the condition for redemption (9). Corollary 1a) states that illiquidity makes funds more fragile. As  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$  decreases in  $\mathcal{L}$ , (9) holds for a larger range of  $v$ . Intuitively, for a given amount of redemption, more assets have to be liquidated in illiquid times. Investors who stay will incur higher costs and are thus more inclined to redeem.

Corollary 1b) shows that whether staleness in the NAV makes funds more or less fragile depends on market liquidity. When liquidity is high, investors behave like arbitrageurs and redeem to profit from the temporary overpricing in the NAV. Staleness increases the scope of overpricing hence making funds more fragile. The more surprising result arises when liquidity is low. In this case, investors are so concerned about redemption externalities that they would redeem even if the intrinsic fund value is going to increase ( $\bar{p}_1 < p_1(v^*)$ ). Then, at the threshold  $p_1(v^*)$ , an increase in staleness *reduces* NAV because  $\frac{\partial}{\partial s} \text{NAV} = \frac{1}{p_0} (\bar{p}_1 - p_1(v^*)) < 0$ . At this decreased NAV, the shares are more *underpriced*. Investors are thus less inclined to redeem and funds become less fragile.

Corollary 1c) shows that funds are more (less) fragile in a loose monetary policy environment when liquidity is high (low). When liquidity is high, investors redeem only if there is sufficient overpricing in NAV. As the bond is more sensitive to interest rate changes in a lower interest rate regime, a given positive interest rate shock reduces bond value more, resulting in more overpricing in the NAV. In contrast, when liquidity is low, investors are inclined to redeem and will only stay if the bond value increases enough. It is easier to achieve such a bond value increase in a lower interest rate regime and hence fragility is reduced.

### 3.3 Main Hypotheses

**Hypothesis 1.** *There is a positive relationship between fund outflows and changes in the Federal Funds Target rate.*

The first hypothesis is our notion of monetary-policy-induced fragility in corporate bond funds. It arises due to the temporary mispricing in the NAV. An increase in the Federal Funds Target rate tends to decrease bond and thus corporate bond fund values, stale NAV implies that the fund shares are temporarily overpriced. Hence, investors have stronger incentives to redeem their shares.

**Hypothesis 2.** *Funds with less liquid assets exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to change in Federal Funds Target rate. The same prediction holds for more illiquid periods.*

The second hypothesis stems from the concern of redemption externalities. An increase in the Federal Funds Target rate causes temporary overpricing in NAVs, inducing some investors to redeem their shares. Their redemption, in turn, leads to costly liquidation of the corporate bonds and such costs are borne by investors who stay. Thus, when liquidity reduces, more investors redeem.

**Hypothesis 3.** *Funds with higher staleness exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflow to change in the Federal Funds Target rate when liquidity is high. As liquidity decreases, the effect of staleness on the sensitivity reduces and eventually becomes negative.*

Hypothesis 3 states the interactive effects of illiquidity and staleness and is the first novel hypothesis from our model. In the case of high liquidity, fund investors are not concerned with the redemption externalities. They behave like arbitrageurs and redeem when the shares are overpriced. Following an increase in the Federal Funds Target rate, the intrinsic fund values decrease. NAVs with higher staleness, by definition, reflect a smaller fraction of the reduction in fund values. Hence, ceteris paribus, there is more *overpricing* in NAVs, inducing more fund investors to redeem. In contrast, when liquidity is low enough, fund investors so concerned with the redemption externalities that they would redeem even if the fund values are expected to rise. In this case, NAVs with higher staleness rise less and the fund shares are more *underpriced*, weakening investors' incentive to redeem.

**Hypothesis 4.** *In a loose monetary policy environment, funds exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflow to a change in the Federal Funds Target rate when liquidity is high. As liquidity decreases, the effect of looseness in monetary policy reduces and eventually becomes negative.*

Hypothesis 4 describes the effect of the monetary policy environment and is the second novel hypothesis from our model. In a low-interest-rate environment, bonds have higher duration and consequently, for a given change in the target Fed funds rate, stale NAVs result in more mispricing. As discussed in the previous hypothesis, investors redeem due to the overpricing in the NAVs when liquidity is high whereas they would only stay if there is enough underpricing in the NAVs when liquidity is low. Therefore, a loose monetary policy environment exacerbates (reduces) outflows when liquidity is high (low).

## 4 Tests of Model Predictions

This section is devoted to empirically testing the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.3. We present evidence from both the daily and monthly samples to provide a comprehensive analysis. While the daily sample offers tighter identification, the monthly sample extends further back in time, encompassing different market conditions.

For the daily analysis, we employ the same methodology as specified in Equation (3). To ensure comparability between the daily and monthly results, we use the predicted FFTar change within the  $[-1, 1]$  window around the FOMC meeting as the explanatory variable. This predicted FFTar change, denoted as  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$ , is in percentage points and is estimated with  $\Delta\text{Eurodollar1m}(\tau + 5, t_1]$ .

For the monthly analysis, we conduct a panel regression using the following specification:

$$\text{OutFlow}_{i,m} = \Delta\text{FFTar}_m + \text{Controls} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,m} \quad (10)$$

where  $\text{OutFlow}_{i,m}$  represents the outflows from fund share  $i$  in month  $m$ , while the key explanatory variable  $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$  is the change in FFTar over the same month. In addition to the macro variables included in specification (1), we incorporate fund-level controls to account for other factors that may influence fund flows. These fund-level controls include the fund's previous month's return,

performance, TNA in log scale, expense ratio, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and an indicator for high-yield funds.<sup>19</sup> Our analysis focuses on the months that coincide with FOMC meetings to reduce noise. Additionally, we assign weights to each observation based on the fund’s TNA value from the previous month. Furthermore, we address the potential intertemporal dependence of flows across funds and over time by clustering the standard errors at both the fund share and month levels.

## 4.1 The Monetary Policy-induced Fragility

We begin with testing Hypothesis 1 to establish the outflow– $\Delta$ FFTar relationship using monthly data. We find results consistent with the analyses of daily data presented in Section 2.3.2, as shown in Table A9. In addition, we uncover an asymmetry in the relationship: the outflow response to an increase in FFTar is more pronounced than the inflow response to a decrease in FFTar. This asymmetry justifies our focus on outflows, hence, fragility induced by monetary policy.

The more pronounced relationship between outflows and increases in FFTar stems from the strategic complementarities among investors’ redemption, which are absent for capital inflows. To see this asymmetry, consider a fund with underpriced shares relative to their intrinsic values. When investors deposit capital to purchase the underpriced shares, the fund suffers a loss and the intrinsic share value drops, reducing the underpricing. In contrast, if the fund shares are overpriced, investors’ redemption further erodes the fund’s intrinsic value, exacerbating the overpricing. Thus, strategic complementarities arise specifically for capital outflows but not for inflows.

The results in Table 9 illustrate the asymmetric relationship. In months with non-negative FFTar changes, we observe 0.365% outflows for a 25-basis-point increase in FFTar (Column 4), which is nearly three times greater than the inflows observed in months with non-positive FFTar

<sup>19</sup> The performance of fund  $i$  at month  $t$  is measured as the past one year’s alpha from the following time-series regression:

$$R_{i,\tau}^e = \text{Perf}_{i,t-12 \rightarrow t-1} + \eta_B R_{B,\tau}^e + \eta_M R_{M,\tau}^e + \varepsilon_{i,\tau}, \quad \tau \in (t-12, t-1) \quad (11)$$

where  $R_{i,\tau}^e$ ,  $R_{B,\tau}^e$  and  $R_{M,\tau}^e$  denote excess returns of the fund share  $i$ , the aggregate bond market and the aggregate stock market, respectively. The risk-free rate is approximated by 1-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).  $R_{B,\tau}^e$  is approximated by the Vanguard total bond market index fund return from Bloomberg and  $R_{M,\tau}^e$  is approximated by CRSP value-weighted market return.

changes (Column 6). We emphasize that our analysis has already controlled for fund performance (alpha). This ensures our monetary policy-driven fragility is not driven by the flow-performance relationship documented in [Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng \(2017\)](#).<sup>20</sup>

We note that the effect size observed in Table 7 is considerably larger than that in Table 9 (1.794 v.s. 0.839). This difference is due to the sample periods: the analyses (with daily data) in Table 7 are done from January 2009 to December 2019, 9 out of 12 FOMC meetings resulted in an increase in FFFtar. This concentration of rate increases likely contributes to a larger size effect.

## 4.2 The Amplifying Effect of Illiquidity

Hypothesis 2 states that redemption externalities are intensified when liquidity is lower, leading to a stronger relationship between outflows and  $\Delta\text{FFTar}$ . To test this hypothesis, we measure liquidity in two ways: fund-level liquid asset holdings and market liquidity. Under either measure of liquidity, the results strongly support this hypothesis.

For a fund-level measure of liquidity, we use each fund's cash and government bond holdings in the year before each FOMC meeting. This measure is consistent with existing work on the use of cash and liquid assets by open-end funds to reduce fragility and fire sales risks ([Liu and Mello, 2011](#); [Zeng, 2017](#); [Chernenko and Sunderam, 2020](#); [Choi et al., 2020](#); [Ma, Xiao, and Zeng, 2022b](#)). Funds with liquid asset holdings above (below) the sample median are classified as liquid (illiquid) funds.

The results regarding fund-level liquidity are reported in Table 10. Panel A presents the findings using daily data. Consistent with the redemption externality hypothesis, we observe that the coefficient loadings of  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$  are significantly higher for the sub-sample of illiquid funds compared to liquid funds. For instance, illiquid funds exhibit a cumulative outflow of 0.442% in the five days preceding FOMC meetings, given a 25-basis-point increase in FFFtar (Column 1). This value is more than three times higher than that of liquid funds (Column 2). Furthermore, the estimates of interaction effects in Columns 3 and 6 confirm the significant difference in the

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<sup>20</sup> [Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng \(2017\)](#) observe 0.215% outflows for 25-basis-point negative alpha in the past month.

sensitivity of outflows to  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$  between illiquid and liquid funds.

With monthly data, we extend our analysis to illiquid market conditions. Specifically, we proxy bond market illiquidity with the VIX index and categorize months into liquid and illiquid periods based on whether the VIX index falls below or above the bottom or top tercile, respectively, throughout the sample period.<sup>21</sup>

The findings are presented in the first three columns of Panel B in Table 10. We observe a significant outflow– $\Delta\text{FFTar}$  sensitivity only in months characterized by high values of the VIX index (Column 1). On average, a 25-basis-point increase in  $\text{FFTar}$  is associated with a 0.784% increase in outflows during these months. We note that this effect size is approximately twice as large as the average effect size of 1.461% observed in Column 4 of Table 9. In the last three columns, we conduct the analyses with the fund-level liquidity measure and reach a similar conclusion.

### 4.3 The Stabilizing Effect of Staleness Under Distress

The results in the previous section demonstrate that illiquid funds or periods experience greater fragility in response to monetary policy changes. In this section, we document a seemingly counter-intuitive finding that the staleness in NAVs could have a stabilizing effect in such circumstances.

The effect of staleness is discussed in Hypothesis 3, which states that staleness exacerbates (mitigates) monetary-policy-induced fragility when liquidity is high (low). These predictions are confirmed in Table 11, where we present results using daily and monthly data. In contrast to the baseline results in Table 6, high-staleness funds do not exhibit a higher sensitivity between outflows and  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$  compared to low-staleness funds in the case of illiquid funds or illiquid market conditions. This is evident in Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A and Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 in Panel B. For the same expected increase in  $\text{FFTar}$ , high-staleness funds experience 12-30% less outflows.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012) construct a corporate bond market illiquidity index. However, this index is only available starting from July 2002, which would limit our sample period. Therefore, we opted to use the VIX index from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as a proxy for corporate bond market illiquidity. It is worth noting that the VIX index exhibits a high Pearson correlation of 87.5% with the DFL index, indicating a strong relationship between the VIX index and corporate bond market illiquidity. Additionally, research by Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) also supports the positive correlation between the VIX index and the illiquidity of corporate bonds.

<sup>22</sup> As we measure fund illiquidity using the proportion of liquid asset holdings, the illiquidity measure does not align

We further test the stabilizing effect of staleness by estimating regressions with three-way interaction effects in columns 3 and 6 of both panels using the full sample. The results demonstrate that the sensitivity between outflows and  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$  increases for illiquid funds, but this effect is attenuated for high-staleness funds, as indicated by the negative coefficients of  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]} \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Illiquid funds}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{high-staleness})$ .

Overall, the results highlight a novel channel in which staleness in NAVs could promote stability in corporate bond mutual funds for illiquid funds or during periods of market stress. This finding has two implications. First, it helps explain why fund managers might not always want to update NAVs promptly, even if they have some discretion in the determination of NAVs.<sup>23</sup> The prior literature views the prevalence of stale NAVs as an agency problem in which fund managers engage in return smoothing. In this sense, we point out the bright side of return smoothing. Second, our results highlight the potential destabilizing effects of staleness-reducing policies during market distress.

#### 4.4 The Impact of Monetary Policy Environments

Hypothesis 4 states that funds exhibit a stronger sensitivity of outflows to changes in FFTar in a loose (tight) monetary policy environment when liquidity is high (low).

To test these predictions, we conduct an analysis using a longer sample with monthly data. We divide the sample into different monetary policy regimes based on the FFTar values. Specifically, we classified months into loose or tight policy regimes based on whether the FFTar was below or above the bottom or top tercile, respectively, over the sample period.

We find results consistent with both predictions. Table 12 presents the results for both liquid periods (Panel A) and liquid funds (Panel B). We find that the sensitivity of investor redemptions to an increase in interest rates is significantly higher during a low Fed fund rate regime for both liquid

perfectly with the staleness measure at the fund level. In Panel B of Table A1, we demonstrate that the sub-samples created based on the staleness and illiquidity measures at the fund level are relatively balanced. This suggests that the sub-samples capture different aspects of fund characteristics.

<sup>23</sup> E.g., from (Choi, Kronlund, and Oh, 2022, p.300), “Under the SEC’s guidance on fair valuation (SEC Accounting Series Release 118), funds retain significant discretion to mark their securities as long as valuation is performed in “good faith.””

periods and liquid funds (Column 2 of both panels). In contrast, in Column 1 of both panels, we observe the opposite results. During illiquid periods or for illiquid funds, capital flows out more aggressively from funds in response to increases in FFTar when the monetary policy environment is tight. In Column 3 of both panels, the negative coefficients on the three-way interaction term  $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low FFTar}_m) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Illiquid})$  suggest that the redemption externalities in distressed periods or funds cause less outflows in the loose monetary policy regime (than in tight regime).

This set of results suggests *when* policymakers should pay special attention to this new unintended consequence of monetary policy. We find increases in FFTar cause strong outflow responses for illiquid funds and in illiquid times, and that the effect is intensified in a tight monetary policy regime.

## 5 Conclusion

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve has been actively maintaining a low Federal Funds Target rate to ease the financing conditions of the real sector. Nevertheless, academics and regulators have voiced concerns regarding various potential negative consequences of this expansionary monetary policy. In this paper, we propose a novel channel via which monetary policy can contribute to the fragility of the increasingly important corporate bond mutual fund sector. Policymakers might thus want to be mindful of this negative consequence of monetary policy.

We conclude by highlighting the novel policy implications following the results of our analyses. First, staleness in NAVs could dampen outflow during stressed periods. Second, changes in policy rates have particularly strong effects on outflow during illiquid periods in a tight policy regime. These results suggest that policies or regulations that aim to enhance the stability of corporate bond funds should be contingent on the funds' staleness, market liquidity, and monetary policy environment.




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
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**Figure 1: Total Net Assets and Flows of Corporate Bond Mutual Funds.** The bar chart in Panel A represents the total net assets (TNA) of corporate bond mutual funds from January 1992 to December 2019. The data is sourced from the CRSP mutual fund database and excludes exchange-traded funds and exchange-traded notes. The line plot on the right y-axis illustrates the ratio of the TNA of corporate bond mutual funds to the total deposits and the core deposits, sourced from the FRED database. Core deposits comprise small time, saving, demand, and other checkable deposits. In Panel B, the red line represents the annual flows as a percentage of the TNA of corporate bond mutual funds. The blue line shows the annual change in mutual funds' holdings of corporate bonds issued by non-financial corporate businesses, based on the FRED database. The right y-axis displays the annual change in the Federal Funds Target rate.



**Figure 2: Staleness of Corporate Bond and Equity Funds.** Figures plot the proportion of non-moving NAV days before FOMC meetings for corporate bonds funds (Panel A) and equity funds (Panel B). This measure is obtained by counting the number of trading days where NAVs do not exhibit any change from the previous trading day and dividing it by the total number of trading days between  $(\tau + 5, -1]$ , where  $\tau$  represents the date of the preceding FOMC meeting. The sample includes all FOMC meetings from January 2009 to December 2019.

**Panel A: Daily Data (2009 to 2019)**

	N	Mean	Std Dev	P5	P25	Median	P75	P95
Outflow (%)	5,786,402	-0.042	0.435	-0.559	-0.097	-0.007	0.060	0.351
Daily return (%)	6,535,747	0.020	0.220	-0.318	-0.089	0.000	0.105	0.375
Outflow <sub>(-5,-1]</sub> (%)	143,902	-0.150	1.476	-2.238	-0.409	-0.019	0.268	1.448
Outflow <sub>(-1,5]</sub> (%)	143,902	-0.297	2.176	-3.449	-0.737	-0.088	0.391	2.259
Outflow <sub>(5,15]</sub> (%)	139,814	-0.378	2.723	-4.442	-0.928	-0.081	0.547	2.802

**Panel B: Monthly Data (1992 to 2019)**

	N	Mean	Std Dev	P5	P25	Median	P75	P95
Monthly outflow (%)	640,943	-0.926	8.387	-13.676	-1.841	0.144	1.600	7.482
Monthly return (%)	640,943	0.389	1.303	-1.786	-0.163	0.360	1.028	2.446
TNA (million)	640,943	405.478	1122.532	0.200	8.200	52.125	246.100	1963.890
Age (years)	640,943	9.353	8.384	0.910	3.321	7.099	13.173	24.515
Expense (%)	563,615	0.998	0.493	0.330	0.640	0.890	1.350	1.900
Cash Holding (%)	551,867	2.739	11.332	-13.870	0.010	2.000	5.100	19.000
Government Bond Holding (%)	551,867	12.744	18.047	0.000	0.000	2.260	21.500	51.200
Maturity (years)	376,556	9.958	5.510	2.900	6.300	9.000	13.100	18.500
Perf (%)	576,731	-0.124	0.426	-0.765	-0.337	-0.113	0.030	0.601
$\eta_B$	576,731	0.658	0.476	-0.088	0.314	0.725	0.969	1.331
$\eta_M$	576,731	0.127	0.164	-0.023	0.010	0.058	0.205	0.480

**Table 2: Summary Statistics of Fund Characteristics.** The table provides a summary of the characteristics of corporate bond mutual funds, utilizing data from CSRP and Morningstar. The daily data spans from January 2009 to December 2019, covering 2,697 funds, while the monthly data encompasses January 1992 to December 2019 and includes 6,393 unique fund share classes across 2,298 distinct funds. Outflow is the fund outflow in a given month or a given period around FOMC meetings in percentage points. Monthly (Daily) return is the monthly (daily) net fund return in percentage points. The table includes the following characteristics: "TNA" indicates the total net assets of the funds, "Age" represents the number of years since the fund's inception as recorded in the CRSP database, "Expense" denotes the fund's expense ratio, expressed in percentage points, "Cash Holdings" reflects the proportion of fund assets held in cash, presented as a percentage, "Government Bond Holding" represents the proportion of fund assets invested in government bonds, also expressed as a percentage and "Maturity" indicates the weighted average maturity of the fund's investments, measured in years. Perf,  $\eta_B$ ,  $\eta_M$  are coefficients from regression (11) for each fund share. Exchange-traded funds and exchange-traded notes have been excluded from the analysis using the CRSP mutual fund database. To address the impact of outliers, all continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% quantile from each tail.

	Annual Outflows (%)			Monthly Outflows (%)		
	Bond funds (1)	Deposits (2)	Core Deposits (3)	Bond funds (4)	Deposits (5)	Core Deposits (6)
$\Delta$ FFTar	6.227*** (0.610)	-0.172 (0.242)	1.911*** (0.261)	1.105*** (0.295)	0.502** (0.219)	0.488** (0.242)
$\Delta$ Baa-Aaa Spread	10.934*** (1.029)	-0.620 (0.409)	-0.056 (0.441)	2.276*** (0.432)	0.128 (0.321)	-1.146*** (0.354)
$\Delta$ 30Y-1Y Spread	3.292*** (0.692)	-0.600** (0.275)	0.881*** (0.296)	0.054 (0.247)	0.029 (0.184)	-0.295 (0.203)
$\Delta$ log(VIX)	-1.811 (1.297)	-0.196 (0.515)	1.516*** (0.556)	0.264 (0.273)	-0.085 (0.203)	0.259 (0.224)
Constant	-6.665*** (0.377)	-6.209*** (0.150)	-6.364*** (0.162)	-0.528*** (0.049)	-0.492*** (0.037)	-0.532*** (0.040)
Observations	336	336	336	336	336	336
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.424	0.037	0.274	0.110	0.007	0.056

**Table 3: Monetary Policy and Outflows from Corporate Bond Mutual Funds and Banks.** The table displays time series regressions of aggregate outflows from corporate bond mutual funds and banks in relation to FFTar changes. The data spans from January 1992 to December 2019. The first three columns present annual outflows, while the last three columns show monthly outflows. All values are expressed as a percentage of the size of aggregate corporate bond mutual funds (columns 1 and 4), commercial bank deposits (columns 2 and 5), and core deposits (columns 3 and 6). Core deposits encompass small time, saving, demand, and other checkable deposits.  $\Delta$ FFTar indicates the percentage point changes in the FFTar rate and shares the same construction window as the dependent variable. Additional macro control variables include the change in the Baa-Aaa Spread, the change in the spread between the 30-year and 1-year Treasury yields, and the logarithmic change in the VIX index. These variables also have the same construction window as the dependent variable. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. Standard errors in brackets are computed with Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.



<b>Panel A: Information since the previous FOMC meeting</b>				
	$\Delta FFTar_{[-1,1]}$			
	Year $\geq$ 1992		Year $\geq$ 2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta FFuture_{(\tau+5,-1]}$	0.881*** (0.077)		0.802*** (0.149)	
$\Delta EuroDollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$		0.616*** (0.056)		1.032*** (0.072)
Constant	-0.0002 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.005)
Observations	255	255	96	96
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.340	0.324	0.228	0.682

<b>Panel B: Information after a shock in FF Futures or Eurodollar Futures</b>				
	$\Delta FFTar_{[-1,1]}$			
	Year $\geq$ 1992		Year $\geq$ 2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta FFuture_{[\tau',\tau'+10]}$	0.725*** (0.162)		1.024** (0.469)	
$\Delta EuroDollar_{[\tau',\tau'+10]}$		0.384*** (0.077)		0.985*** (0.116)
Constant	0.001 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.022 (0.019)	0.004 (0.012)
Observations	120	120	44	44
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.138	0.169	0.081	0.623

**Table 4: Predictive Regressions for Federal Fund Target Rate Changes.** The table presents the results of predictive regressions to predict FFTar changes within a window of  $[-1, 1]$  around FOMC meetings, using market data prior to the meetings. Panel A displays the outcomes of the analysis of rate changes in the Federal Funds Futures (columns 1 and 3) and Eurodollar Futures (columns 2 and 4) within the  $(\tau+5, -1]$  window. Here,  $\tau$  represents the date of the preceding FOMC meeting. In Panel B, the study identifies the earliest date before each FOMC meeting where the daily rate change for the Eurodollar Futures exceeds the 95th percentile of the sample. This date is denoted as  $\tau'$ . Subsequently, rate changes within a 10-day window following  $\tau'$  (but before FOMC meetings) are calculated. The analysis employs two different sample windows: January 1991 to December 2019 and January 2009 to December 2019. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: High-Staleness Corporate Bond Funds								
	$\Delta NAV_{i,(\tau+5,-5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-1,5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(5,15]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta Eurodollar 1m_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-2.187***	-2.120**	-0.941***	-0.844**				
	(0.804)	(0.813)	(0.346)	(0.335)				
$\Delta Eurodollar 1m_{(\tau+5,-1]}$					-1.339***	-1.197***		
					(0.450)	(0.434)		
$\Delta Eurodollar 1m_{(\tau+5,5]}$							-0.252	-0.064
							(0.565)	(0.488)
Controls $_{i,t-1}^F$		✓		✓		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	75,100	69,796	75,093	69,792	77,625	72,067	76,447	70,937
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.030	0.080	0.030	0.072	0.025	0.050	0.002	0.028

Panel B: Low-Staleness Corporate Bond Funds								
	$\Delta NAV_{i,(\tau+5,-5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-1,5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(5,15]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta Eurodollar 1m_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-2.350**	-2.121**	-0.947*	-0.855				
	(1.061)	(1.053)	(0.527)	(0.516)				
$\Delta Eurodollar 1m_{(\tau+5,-1]}$					-1.210*	-1.049		
					(0.657)	(0.676)		
$\Delta Eurodollar 1m_{(\tau+5,5]}$							-0.538	-0.431
							(0.582)	(0.579)
Controls $_{i,t-1}^F$		✓		✓		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	91,283	85,247	91,265	85,233	94,658	88,399	93,267	87,065
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.025	0.020	0.015	0.011	0.0004	0.005	-0.009

**Table 5: NAV Changes around FOMC Meetings.** This table compares the responsiveness of fund NAVs to market information on monetary policy changes around FOMC meetings, separately for high-staleness funds in Panel A and low-staleness funds in Panel B. The dependent variables are the logarithmic changes in NAV for each fund share  $i$  within four different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , with 0 representing the date of the FOMC meeting, and  $\tau$  indicating the date of the previous FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates are measured within the respective windows. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)staleness funds. We also include one-year lagged fund characteristics, such as the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and high-yield fund indicator, as controls, denoted as Controls $_{i,t-1}^F$ . Each observation is weighted by the previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub>			OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-1,5]</sub>			OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(5,15]</sub>		
	High-stale (1)	Low-stale (2)	All (3)	High-stale (4)	Low-stale (5)	All (6)	High-stale (7)	Low-stale (8)	All (9)
$\Delta$ Eurodollar1m <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-5]</math></sub>	1.164*** (0.245)	0.706** (0.299)	0.706** (0.299)						
$\Delta$ Eurodollar1m <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-5]</math></sub> $\times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$			0.458** (0.208)						
$\Delta$ Eurodollar1m <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-1]</math></sub>				2.023*** (0.472)	0.981** (0.479)	0.981** (0.479)			
$\Delta$ Eurodollar1m <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-1]</math></sub> $\times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$						1.042** (0.407)			
$\Delta$ Eurodollar1m <sub>(<math>\tau+5,5]</math></sub>							1.142*** (0.433)	0.998** (0.469)	0.998** (0.469)
$\Delta$ Eurodollar1m <sub>(<math>\tau+5,5]</math></sub> $\times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$									0.144 (0.225)
Controls <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	56,679	69,358	126,037	56,673	69,381	126,054	55,271	67,778	123,049
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.074	0.103	0.092	0.093	0.105	0.100	0.108	0.118	0.114

**Table 6: Monetary Policy-Induced Fragility.** This table examines how fund flows respond to market information regarding monetary policy changes around FOMC meetings, specifically comparing the responses of high-staleness funds to low-staleness funds (which we refer to as High-stale and Low-stale to conserve space). The dependent variables are the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within three different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , where 0 represents the date of the FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates is measured within the respective windows  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(\tau+5,-1]$ , and  $(\tau+5,5]$ , where  $\tau$  indicates the date of the previous FOMC meeting. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)staleness funds. The interaction terms measure the difference in the outflow-rate relationship between high-staleness and low-staleness funds. Controls<sub>*i,t-1*</sub><sup>F</sup> are one-year lagged fund characteristics, including the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by the previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

	Daily Evidence				Monthly Evidence	
	OutFlows <sub>i,(-5,-1]</sub>		OutFlows <sub>i,(-5,5]</sub>		OutFlow <sub>i,m</sub> (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta\widehat{\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$	1.077*** (0.369)	0.925*** (0.299)	1.822*** (0.607)	1.562*** (0.534)		
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$					1.227* (0.657)	1.794** (0.851)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$		✓		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓		
Observations	136,359	126,928	136,500	127,063	257,284	199,053
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.094	0.009	0.127	0.010	0.107

**Table 7: Outflow- $\Delta\text{FFTar}$  Relationship After the Financial Crisis.** This table presents how fund flows respond to Federal Funds Target rate changes around FOMC meetings from January 2009 to December 2019. The first four columns report results using daily data from MorningStar, where the dependent variable is the cumulative fund outflows in percentage points for fund share  $i$  in windows of  $(-5,-1]$  and  $(-5,5]$  around meetings. The predicted changes in  $\text{FFTar}$ , also in percentage points, are based on  $\Delta\text{Eurodollar1m}(\tau + 5, -5]$ , denoted as  $\Delta\widehat{\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$ . The one-year lagged fund characteristics, including the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and high-yield fund indicator, are denoted as  $\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$ . Macro control variables,  $\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$ , include the change in the Baa-Aaa Spread, the change in the spread between the 30-year and 1-year Treasury yields, and the logarithmic change in the VIX index. Each observation is weighted by the previous year's end-of-year fund TNA (total net asset). Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. The last two columns report results using monthly data from CRSP Mutual Fund database.  $\text{OutFlow}_{i,m}$  is the fund outflow for fund share  $i$  in month  $m$ , while  $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$  represents the changes in  $\text{FFTar}$  in percentage points. Fund characteristics, such as last month's performance, return, TNA in log scale, expense ratio, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and high-yield fund indicator, are also included. Each observation is weighted by last month's fund TNA value, and standard errors are clustered at the fund share and month levels. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

<b>Panel A: High-staleness Corporate Bond Funds</b>				
	$\Delta NAV_{[\tau', \tau'+10]}$		$OutFlow_{[\tau', \tau'+10]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta EuroDollar_{[\tau', \tau'+10]}$	-0.016 (0.863)	-0.635 (0.896)	1.103*** (0.250)	2.656*** (0.431)
Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓
Observations	33,014	30,717	32,366	30,114
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.00003	0.064	0.002	0.105

<b>Panel B: Low-staleness Corporate Bond Funds</b>				
	$\Delta NAV_{[\tau', \tau'+10]}$		$OutFlow_{[\tau', \tau'+10]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta EuroDollar_{[\tau', \tau'+10]}$	-1.682** (0.687)	-2.288** (0.880)	1.376 (1.448)	1.129 (1.241)
Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓
Observations	36,299	33,816	35,634	33,197
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.055	0.00002	0.019

**Table 8: NAV and Flow Changes following Movements in Market Rates** This table presents how NAV and flow move after a sharp jump in Eurodollar Future rates for high-staleness funds versus low-staleness funds. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)staleness funds. We first identify the earliest date before each FOMC meeting where the daily rate change for Eurodollar Futures surpasses the 95th percentile of the sample, denoted as date  $\tau'$ . Then, we calculate the Eurodollar Future rate changes, NAV changes, and outflows in a 10-day window following that date (but before FOMC meetings). We also include one-year lagged fund characteristics, such as the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and high-yield fund indicator, as controls, denoted as Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$ . Each observation is weighted by the previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

	OutFlow <sub><i>i,m</i></sub> (%) in Months with FOMC meetings					
	All		$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \geq 0$		$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \leq 0$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	1.114*** (0.289)	0.839*** (0.279)	2.122*** (0.448)	1.461*** (0.468)	0.572* (0.314)	0.507 (0.360)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$		✓		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓		✓
Observations	447,005	304,687	398,392	281,861	374,113	251,244
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.080	0.009	0.078	0.008	0.081

**Table 9: Asymmetric Flow Response and Monetary Policy-Induced Fragility (Monthly Evidence).** This table examines the impact of monetary policy changes on fund flows of corporate bond mutual funds from January 1992 to December 2019. Only months with FOMC meetings are included in the analysis. The table studies the outflow-rate relationship in the entire sample (columns 1-2), in months with non-negative FFTar moves (columns 3-4), and in months with non-positive FFTar moves (columns 5-6). OutFlow<sub>*i,m*</sub> represents the outflow of fund share *i* in month *m*, and  $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$  denotes the percentage point changes in FFTar. The macro controls,  $\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$ , include the change in the Baa-Aaa Spread, the change in the spread between the 30-year and 1-year Treasury yields, and the logarithmic change in the VIX index. Fund characteristics encompass the previous month's performance, return, TNA on a logarithmic scale, expense ratio, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and a high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by the TNA value of the fund from the previous month. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. Standard errors are clustered at the fund share and month levels. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

<b>Panel A: Daily Evidence</b>									
	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub>			OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-1,5]</sub>			OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(5,15]</sub>		
	Illiquid (1)	Liquid (2)	All (3)	Illiquid (4)	Liquid (5)	All (6)	Illiquid (7)	Liquid (8)	All (9)
$\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$	1.766*** (0.655)	0.512** (0.224)	0.512** (0.224)	1.843*** (0.597)	0.753** (0.362)	0.753** (0.362)	1.742** (0.732)	0.778 (0.491)	0.778 (0.491)
$\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]} \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Illiquid funds})$			1.254** (0.627)			1.090* (0.560)			0.965 (0.609)
Controls <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	63,747	63,181	126,928	63,743	63,202	126,945	61,806	61,284	123,090
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.135	0.086	0.109	0.140	0.091	0.111	0.148	0.109	0.127

<b>Panel B: Monthly Evidence</b>						
	OutFlow <sub><i>i,m</i></sub> (%) in Months with FOMC meetings & $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \geq 0$					
	Liquid vs. Illiquid Market Condition			Liquid vs. Illiquid Funds		
	High VIX (1)	Low VIX (2)	All (3)	Low CashBond (4)	High CashBond (5)	All (6)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	3.135*** (0.945)	0.341 (0.499)	0.341 (0.498)	2.464*** (0.655)	0.064 (0.745)	0.064 (0.771)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High VIX})$			2.794** (1.095)			
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low CashBond})$						2.401** (0.970)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Observations	89,860	118,582	208,442	97,300	97,300	191,150
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.105	0.113	0.110	0.112	0.112	0.097

**Table 10: The Amplifying Effect of Illiquidity on Monetary Policy-Induced Fragility.** The table investigates the impact of fund illiquidity on monetary policy-induced fragility around FOMC meetings, with separate analyses conducted for daily and monthly data presented in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. In Panel A, for each FOMC meeting, we classify funds whose last year's percentage holding of liquid assets (cash and government bonds) is higher-(lower-)than-sample median as liquid (illiquid) funds. The dependent variables are the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within three different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , with 0 representing the date of the FOMC meeting. Columns (1)-(2) predict  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$  using  $\Delta\text{EuroDollar1m}(\tau+5,-5]$ , denoted as  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$ . Similarly, columns 3-4 and 5-6 predict  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}}_{[-1,1]}$  using  $\Delta\text{EuroDollar1m}(\tau+5,-1]$  and  $\Delta\text{EuroDollar1m}(\tau+5,5]$ , respectively, where  $\tau$  indicates the date of the previous FOMC meeting. The remaining details align with those provided in Table 6. In Panel B, the analysis focuses on months with FOMC meetings and non-negative Federal Fund Target rate moves. High (Low) VIX months refer to months with a VIX index above (below) the top (bottom) tercile of the sample. Low (High) CashBond funds denote funds with a proportion of cash and government bond holdings below (above) the bottom (top) tercile within each Lipper objective category of each year. Each observation is weighted by the TNA value of the fund from the previous month. The remaining details align with those provided in Table 9. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: Daily Evidence									
	OutFlows <sub>i,(-5,-1]</sub>			OutFlows <sub>i,(-1,5]</sub>			OutFlows <sub>i,(5,15]</sub>		
	Sub-sample of Illiquid Funds		All	Sub-sample of Illiquid Funds		All	Sub-sample of Illiquid Funds		All
	High-stale (1)	Low-stale (2)	(3)	High-stale (4)	Low-stale (5)	(6)	High-stale (7)	Low-stale (8)	(9)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}$	1.108*** (0.281)	1.248* (0.636)	0.280 (0.212)	2.025*** (0.478)	1.680* (0.853)	0.576 (0.383)	1.385** (0.598)	2.112** (1.050)	0.688 (0.576)
$\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}} \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Illiquid funds})$			1.432** (0.626)			1.376* (0.789)			1.624 (1.120)
$\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}} \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Illiquid funds}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$			-0.945* (0.487)			-0.641 (0.625)			-1.366 (1.550)
Controls <sub>i,t-1</sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	32,000	31,297	126,037	32,001	31,292	126,054	31,084	30,701	123,049
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.110	0.158	0.095	0.115	0.164	0.099	0.126	0.165	0.111

Panel B: Monthly Evidence						
	OutFlow <sub>i,m</sub> (%) in Months with FOMC meetings & $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \geq 0$					
	Sub-sample of Illiquid Months		All	Sub-sample of Illiquid Funds		All
	High-stale (1)	Low-stale (2)	(3)	High-stale (4)	Low-stale (5)	(6)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	2.040*** (0.749)	2.929* (1.530)	-1.151 (0.824)	1.440 (0.945)	1.678** (0.798)	-1.006 (1.386)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High VIX})$			4.080** (1.813)			
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low CashBond})$						2.843** (1.401)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High VIX}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$			-1.139 (1.536)			
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low CashBond}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$						-2.717* (1.462)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls <sub>i,t-1</sub> <sup>F</sup>		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations		36,069	35,819	159,799	38,608	35,089
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.109	0.131	0.130	0.125	0.131

**Table 11: The Stabilizing Effect of Staleness on Monetary Policy-Induced Fragility in Distress.** The table examines the impact of fund staleness on monetary policy-induced fragility in illiquid funds or during illiquid periods, using daily and monthly data presented in Panel A and B, respectively. In Panel A, the focus is on funds with a last year's percentage holding of liquid assets (cash and government bonds) below the sample median, which are categorized as illiquid funds. Funds experiencing a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-staleness (low-staleness) funds (which we refer to as high-stale and low stale funds to conserve space). The dependent variables are the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within three different time windows around FOMC meetings: (-5,-1], (-1,5], and (5,15], with 0 representing the date of the FOMC meeting. Columns (1)-(2) predict FFFTar changes, in percentage points, within the [-1,1] window around the FOMC meeting using  $\Delta\text{Eurodollar1m}(\tau + 5, -5]$ , denoted as  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}}$ . Similarly, columns 3-4 and 5-6 predict  $\widehat{\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}}$  using  $\Delta\text{Eurodollar1m}(\tau + 5, -1]$  and  $\Delta\text{Eurodollar1m}(\tau + 5, 5]$ , respectively, where  $\tau$  indicates the date of the previous FOMC meeting. The remaining details align with those provided in Table 6. In Panel B, the analysis is conducted on months with FOMC meetings and non-negative Federal Fund Target rate moves. The sub-sample of illiquid months includes months with a VIX index above the top tercile of the sample. Similarly, the sub-sample of illiquid funds comprises funds with a proportion of cash and government bond holdings below the bottom tercile within each Lipper objective category of each year. High-staleness (low-staleness) funds (which we refer to as high-stale and low-stale funds to conserve space) are identified as those with a proportion of non-moving NAV days in the previous month higher (lower) than the top (bottom) tercile within each Lipper objective category. Each observation is weighted by the TNA value of the fund from the previous month. All other details align with those provided in Table 9. Notably, two-way interactions are not reported in the table. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.



<b>Panel A: Liquid vs. Illiquid Market Condition</b>			
	OutFlow <sub>i,m</sub> (%) in Months with FOMC meetings		
	High VIX Months (1)	Low VIX Months (2)	All Sample (3)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	1.902*** (0.358)	-0.466 (0.382)	-0.387 (0.390)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low FFTar})$	-2.553*** (0.611)	2.155** (0.996)	1.089 (0.780)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High VIX})$			1.438*** (0.442)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low FFTar}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High VIX})$			-2.572** (1.078)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	55,925	69,149	125,074
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.213	0.183	0.158

<b>Panel B: Liquid vs. Illiquid Funds</b>			
	OutFlow <sub>i,m</sub> (%) in Months with FOMC meetings		
	Low CashBond Funds (1)	High CashBond Funds (2)	All Sample (3)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	1.104** (0.556)	0.321 (0.326)	0.431 (0.337)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low FFTar})$	-1.315* (0.689)	1.699** (0.777)	1.887** (0.809)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low CashBond})$			0.631 (0.637)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low FFTar}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Low CashBond})$			-2.971*** (1.098)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	71,482	68,980	140,462
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.170	0.153	0.149

**Table 12: The Effect of Monetary Policy Environment on Monetary Policy-Induced Fragility (Monthly Evidence)**

The table examines the impact of the monetary policy environment on monetary policy-induced fragility for corporate bond mutual funds from January 1992 to December 2019. The analysis focuses on months with FOMC meetings and non-negative Federal Fund Target rate moves. A loose monetary policy environment refers to months with FFTar below the bottom tercile of the sample (Low FFTar), while a tight monetary policy environment refers to months with FFTar above the top tercile of the sample. Panel A compares the effects in liquid versus illiquid market conditions. Illiquid market conditions refer to months with a VIX index above the top tercile of the sample (High VIX months), while the opposite applies to Low VIX months. Panel B compares the effects in liquid versus illiquid funds. We refer to illiquid funds as those holding a proportion of cash and government bond holdings below the bottom tercile within each Lipper objective category of each year (Low CashBond Funds), while the opposite applies to Low CashBond funds. Each observation is weighted by the TNA value of the fund from the previous month. The controls include all macro controls and fund characteristics as in Table 9. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. Standard errors are clustered at the fund share and month levels. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

## 6 Proofs

### 6.1 Parameter restrictions in Assumption 1

For a given  $\{r, s, \sigma\}$ ,  $\bar{p}_1$  is fixed. Using the definition of  $\bar{v}$  and  $\underline{v}$ , the conditions for  $\bar{v}$  and  $\underline{v}$  to be within the support  $\left[-\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}\right]$  can be written as

$$\mathcal{L} > 1 - s + s\bar{p}_1[(1+r) - \sigma/\sqrt{3}] \equiv \underline{\mathcal{L}} \quad (12)$$

$$\psi < s\bar{p}_1[(1+r) + \sigma/\sqrt{3}] - s \equiv \bar{\psi} \quad (13)$$

Intuitively, if the liquidation cost is too high ( $\mathcal{L} < \underline{\mathcal{L}}$ ), staying can never be a dominant strategy. Similarly, if the benefit of staying in the fund is too high ( $\psi > \bar{\psi}$ ), redeeming can never be a dominant strategy.  $\bar{\psi} > 0$  as  $\bar{p}_1(1+r) - 1 > 0$  due to Jensen's inequality ( $p_1 = \frac{1}{1+r+\sigma v}$  is a convex function in  $v$ ). Moreover, as  $\sigma \rightarrow (1+r)/\sqrt{3}$ ,  $\underline{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow 1 - s < 1$ . There exists a  $\underline{\sigma} \in (0, (1+r)/\sqrt{3})$  such that for  $\sigma > \underline{\sigma}$ ,  $\underline{\mathcal{L}} < 1$ .

### 6.2 Proposition 1

*Proof.* In this proof, we first establish the existence of a unique equilibrium with a symmetric switching strategy. Then, we characterize the equilibrium threshold  $v^*$ . Finally, we establish the listed properties of the important equilibrium function  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$ .

**Existence of a unique equilibrium.** The existence of a unique equilibrium with a symmetric switching strategy, in which every investor redeems when  $v > v^*$  and stays when  $v < v^*$ , follows from [Morris and Shin \(2003\)](#), Lemma 2.3. Below we show that  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  satisfies the assumptions A1\* (Action Single Crossing) and A2 (State Monotonicity) in [Morris and Shin \(2003\)](#). It is immediate to check that the remaining assumptions A3, A4, A5, and A7 are also satisfied.

First, we show that  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  satisfies Action Single Crossing A1\*. That is, for any  $v \in (\underline{v}, \bar{v})$ , there exists a unique  $\hat{\lambda}$  such that  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v) < 0$  when  $\lambda < \hat{\lambda}$  and  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v) > 0$  when  $\lambda > \hat{\lambda}$ . We note that at  $\lambda = 0$ ,  $\Delta\pi(0, v) < 0$ . For  $\lambda \leq \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1}$ ,  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  strictly increases in  $\lambda$ . For  $\lambda > \frac{\mathcal{L}p_1}{s\bar{p}_1 + (1-s)p_1}$ ,  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  strictly decreases in  $\lambda$ . Finally, at  $\lambda = 1$ ,  $\Delta\pi(1, v) > 0$ . Therefore, there is exactly one such  $\hat{\lambda}$  exists.

For A2 State Monotonicity, we need to show  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  is non-decreasing in  $v$ , or, non-increasing in  $p_1$ . For a given  $\lambda$ , for low enough  $p_1$ , the fund is liquidated and  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  does not depend on  $p_1$ . As  $p_1$  increases to the point where the fund is not fully liquidated,  $\frac{\partial\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)}{\partial p_1} = \frac{-s\bar{p}_1}{(1-\lambda)p_1} < 0$ . Hence  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  is decreasing in  $p_1$ . Putting the two cases together,  $\Delta\pi(\lambda, v)$  is non-increasing in  $p_1$ .

**Equilibrium threshold**  $v^*$ . Next, we invoke the standard result in global game that shows as the signal noise goes to zero  $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ , the proportion of investors redeeming  $\lambda$  given switching threshold  $v^*$  is uniformly distributed over  $[0,1]$  (Morris and Shin, 2003; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). In the equilibrium, the marginal investor receiving signal  $v^*$  is indifference between investing in the fund and the bank, that is,  $\int_{\lambda} \Delta\pi(\lambda, v^*)d\lambda = 0$ . With above results, this equation can be written as

$$\underbrace{\int_0^{\frac{\mathcal{L}p_1/p_0}{\text{NAV}}} \left( \frac{\text{NAV}}{p_1} - \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \times \left( \frac{1}{p_0} - \frac{\lambda \text{NAV}}{\mathcal{L}p_1} \right) - \frac{\psi}{p_0} \right) d\lambda}_{\text{net payoff when the fund is liquid}} + \underbrace{\int_{\frac{\mathcal{L}p_1/p_0}{\text{NAV}}}^1 \frac{\mathcal{L}}{p_0\lambda} d\lambda}_{\text{net payoff when the fund is illiquid}} = 0.$$

Rearranging the above equation and denoting  $X = \frac{p_1}{p_0 \text{NAV}}$  gives

$$\mathcal{L} + \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}X} \right) - \log(\mathcal{L}X) \mathcal{L} = 1 + \psi \mathcal{L}X. \quad (14)$$

We note that the solution for  $X$  in the above equation is a function of  $\mathcal{L}$  and  $\psi$  only. We denote  $X = g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$ . Rearrange above equation gives the expression (7).

**Properties of  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$ .** For the following proof, it is useful to recall the following inequalities (Topsok (2006)):

$$\frac{2z}{2+z} \geq \log(1+z) \geq \frac{z}{2} \cdot \frac{2+z}{1+z} \quad \text{for } -1 < z \leq 0$$

We first show that there exist a unique solution  $X = g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) \in (0, \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}})$  to equation (7). The  $\log(1 - \mathcal{L}X)$  and  $\log(\mathcal{L}X)$  in equation (7) requires the solution  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) \in (0, \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}})$ . We define  $h(X)$  function as below

$$h(X) := \mathcal{L} + \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}X} \right) - \log(\mathcal{L}X) \mathcal{L} - 1 - \psi \mathcal{L}X = 0$$

Equation (7) is rewritten as  $h(X) = 0$ . For any given  $\mathcal{L} \in (0, 1)$  and  $\psi > 0$ , we note that  $h(X)$  is continuous,  $\lim_{X \rightarrow 0} h(X) > 0$ , and  $\lim_{X \rightarrow \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}}} h(X) < 0$ . Also  $h'(X) < 0$  since it has the same sign as

$$\begin{aligned} & -\mathcal{L}^2 X + \mathcal{L}X - (\mathcal{L}X)^2 \psi + \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) \\ \leq & -\mathcal{L}^2 X + \mathcal{L}X + \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) \\ \leq & -\mathcal{L}^2 X + \mathcal{L}X - \frac{2\mathcal{L}X}{2 - \mathcal{L}X} < 0 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, there exists a unique solution  $X = g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) \in (0, \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}})$  such that  $h(X) = 0$ .

Next, we show that  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}} < 0$ . By implicit function theorem,  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}} = -\frac{\frac{\partial h}{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{\frac{\partial h}{\partial X}}$ . As  $\frac{\partial h}{\partial X} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}}$  has the same sign as  $\frac{\partial h}{\partial \mathcal{L}}$ , which is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) - \mathcal{L}X(\mathcal{L}\psi X + \mathcal{L} \log(\mathcal{L}X) - 1) \\
= & \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) - \mathcal{L}X(-2 + \mathcal{L} + \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X)(1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}X})) \quad \text{as } h(X) = 0 \\
= & \log(1 - \mathcal{L}X)(2 - \mathcal{L}X) + 2\mathcal{L}X(1 - X) \\
\leq & \frac{-2\mathcal{L}X}{2 - \mathcal{L}X}(2 - \mathcal{L}X) + 2\mathcal{L}X(1 - X) < 0
\end{aligned}$$

By a similar argument,  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \psi} < 0$  because  $\frac{\partial h}{\partial \psi} = -\mathcal{L} < 0$ .

Lastly, we show  $\lim_{\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1} g(\mathcal{L}, 0) = 1$ . For  $\psi = 0$ , we can write the condition  $h(X) = 0$  as

$$\log(1 - \mathcal{L}X) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}X}\right) - \log(\mathcal{L}X)\mathcal{L} = 1 - \mathcal{L} \quad (15)$$

We note that the left hand side (L.H.S. of) (15) is strictly positive for any  $X < \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}}$  and is decreasing in  $X$ . As  $\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1$ , the R.H.S. of (15) approaches to 0. The L.H.S. approaches 0 only when  $\mathcal{L}X \rightarrow 1$ . This completes the proof that  $\lim_{\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1} g(\mathcal{L}, 0) = 1$ .

□

### 6.3 Corollary 1

*Proof.* **Proof for part a):** Using Equation (7),

$$\text{sign}\left(\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial \mathcal{L}}\right) = \text{sign}\left(\frac{\partial}{\partial \mathcal{L}}[1 - (1 - s)g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)]/sg(\mathcal{L}, \psi)\right) = \text{sign}\left(-\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}}\right) > 0$$

□

**Proof for part b):** Using Equation (7),

$$\text{sign}\left(\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial s}\right) = \text{sign}\left(\frac{\partial}{\partial s}[1 - (1 - s)g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)]/sg(\mathcal{L}, \psi)\right) = \text{sign}(g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) - 1)$$

For any given  $\psi \geq 0$ , as  $\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1$ ,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) < 1$  and  $\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial s} < 0$ . That is, staleness increases fragility when market is liquid enough. As  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial}{\partial \mathcal{L}}\left(\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial s}\right) < 0$ .

It remains to characterize  $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi)$  such that for  $\mathcal{L} < \tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi)$ ,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) > 1$  and hence  $\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial s} > 0$ . Define  $\tilde{h}(\mathcal{L}, \psi) := h(1) = \mathcal{L} + \log(1 - \mathcal{L})\left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{L}}\right) - \log(\mathcal{L})\mathcal{L} - 1 - \psi\mathcal{L}$ . For any given  $\psi > 0$ , define  $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi)$  which satisfies  $\tilde{h}(\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi), \psi) = 0$ , or equivalently,  $g(\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi), \psi) = 1$ . We note that since  $\lim_{\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 0} \tilde{h}(\mathcal{L}, \psi) = 0$  and  $\lim_{\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 0} \frac{\partial \tilde{h}}{\partial \mathcal{L}} = +\infty$ ,  $\tilde{h}(\epsilon, \psi) > 0$  for an arbitrarily small  $\epsilon$ . Combine with the facts that  $\lim_{\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1} \tilde{h}(\mathcal{L}, \psi) = -\psi < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial^2 \tilde{h}}{\partial \mathcal{L}^2} < 0$ , there exists a unique  $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi) \in (0, 1)$  that

satisfies  $\tilde{h}(\mathcal{L}(\psi), \psi) = 0$ , or equivalently,  $g(\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi), \psi) = 1$ . Finally, as  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \mathcal{L}} < 0$ ,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) > 1$  for  $\mathcal{L} < \tilde{\mathcal{L}}(\psi)$ .

□

**Proof for part c):**

The partial derivative of  $v^*$  on  $r$  is

$$\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial r} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{1 - (1-s)g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)}{sg(\mathcal{L}, \psi)} \frac{1}{\bar{p}_1^2} \mathbb{E}[p_1^2] - 1 \right).$$

For a given  $\psi > 0$ , as  $\mathcal{L} \rightarrow 1$ ,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi) < 1$ . Then,  $\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial r} > 0$  because


$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1 - (1-s)g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)}{sg(\mathcal{L}, \psi)} \frac{1}{\bar{p}_1^2} \mathbb{E}[p_1^2] - 1 \\ & \geq \frac{1}{\bar{p}_1^2} \mathbb{E}[p_1^2] - 1 \\ & = \frac{\text{Var}(p_1)}{\bar{p}_1^2} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore,  $\frac{\partial}{\partial(-\mathcal{L})} \left( \frac{\partial v^*}{\partial r} \right) < 0$ . This is because as  $\mathcal{L}$  decreases,  $g(\mathcal{L}, \psi)$  increases and  $\frac{\partial v^*}{\partial r}$  decreases and can become negative.

□

# **Appendix for Online Publication**

# A Figures



**Figure A1: Future Federal Funds Target Rate Changes are Predictable** The presented figures display the correlation between changes in the Eurodollar Future rates, in percentage points, within the  $(\tau+5, -1]$  window before each FOMC meeting (where  $\tau$  refers to the preceding FOMC meeting) and the changes in FFTar, in percentage points, announced during the meeting. The blue triangular data points signify meetings where the pre-meeting Future rate changes accurately predict the direction of the Federal Funds Target rate changes.

## B Tables

Panel A: Bond Fund Characteristics						
	log(TNA) (1)	Institution (2)	Cash+Bond Holding (3)	Expense Ratio (4)	High Yield (5)	Maturity (6)
High Staleness	-0.031 (0.035)	0.006 (0.007)	-2.159*** (0.242)	0.093 (0.057)	-0.033*** (0.006)	-1.431*** (0.084)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	34,197	34,253	34,012	32,501	34,253	31,194
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.004	0.030	0.001	0.001	0.027

**Panel B: Number of Observations for Sub-samples**

	High-stale	Low-stale
Low Cashbond	33,089	32,443
High Cashbond	25,604	39,223

**Table A1: Fund Characteristics of High- vs. Low-stale Corporate Bond Funds.** Panel A compares fund characteristics for high-stale versus low-stale corporate bond funds from 2009 to 2019. The observation is at the fund-year level. The fund characteristics considered in the analysis include the total net asset (in logarithmic scale), an institutional fund indicator, the percentage of cash and government bond holdings, a high-yield fund indicator, and the maturity of the funds in years. High-stale funds are defined as funds with a proportion of non-moving net asset value (NAV) days higher than the median in the non-FOMC window preceding the preceding FOMC meeting. Conversely, low-stale funds refer to funds with a proportion of non-moving NAV days lower than the median during the same period. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows, with standard errors clustered at the fund-share level. In Panel B, the number of observations is reported for each sub-sample classified based on funds' staleness and cash and government bonds holding. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. Funds whose last year's percentage holding of liquid assets (cash and government bonds) is higher-(lower-)than the sample median are classified as liquid (illiquid) funds. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.



Panel A: High-stale Corporate Bond Funds								
	$\Delta NAV_{i,(\tau+5,-5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-1,5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(5,15]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-1.754**	-1.687**	-0.951***	-0.850**				
	(0.698)	(0.690)	(0.356)	(0.338)				
$\Delta Treasury5y_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-1.475***	-1.467***	0.037	0.019				
	(0.450)	(0.435)	(0.198)	(0.178)				
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$					-1.349***	-1.204***		
					(0.470)	(0.457)		
$\Delta Treasury5y_{(\tau+5,-1]}$					0.046	0.033		
					(0.294)	(0.292)		
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,5]}$							-0.284	-0.095
							(0.575)	(0.496)
$\Delta Treasury5y_{(\tau+5,5]}$							0.123	0.123
							(0.154)	(0.144)
Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$		✓		✓		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	75,100	69,796	75,093	69,792	77,625	72,067	76,447	70,937
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.110	0.158	0.030	0.072	0.025	0.050	0.004	0.031

Panel B: Low-stale Corporate Bond Funds								
	$\Delta NAV_{i,(\tau+5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-1,5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(5,15]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-1.728**	-1.445*	-0.986*	-0.895*				
	(0.827)	(0.755)	(0.540)	(0.527)				
$\Delta Treasury5y_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-2.925***	-2.975***	0.180	0.173				
	(0.568)	(0.542)	(0.237)	(0.235)				
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$					-1.200*	-1.035		
					(0.668)	(0.693)		
$\Delta Treasury5y_{(\tau+5,-1]}$					-0.047	-0.059		
					(0.381)	(0.384)		
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,5]}$							-0.637	-0.537
							(0.580)	(0.578)
$\Delta Treasury5y_{(\tau+5,5]}$							0.288	0.292
							(0.227)	(0.225)
Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$		✓		✓		✓		✓
Fund FE		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	91,283	85,247	91,265	85,233	94,658	88,399	93,267	87,065
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.230	0.241	0.024	0.019	0.012	0.001	0.014	0.0004

**Table A2: NAV Changes around FOMC Meetings: Short-term Monetary Policy Changes versus Long-term Treasury Yield Changes** This table compares the responsiveness of fund NAVs to market information around FOMC meetings, separately for high-stale funds in Panel A and low-stale funds in Panel B. The dependent variables in the analysis are the logarithmic changes in NAV for each fund share  $i$  within four different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , with 0 representing the date of the FOMC meeting, and  $\tau$  indicating the date of the previous FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates and the 5-year Treasury yields is measured within the respective windows. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. We also include one-year lagged fund characteristics, such as the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and high-yield fund indicator, as controls, denoted as Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$ . Each observation is weighted by previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting<sup>3</sup> and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

**Panel A: Heterogeneous Effects**

	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub> (%)			
	Inst	Retail	Index	Non-index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	0.674***	1.320***	1.359	0.835***
	(0.224)	(0.486)	(1.081)	(0.273)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	63,066	63,862	4,676	122,252
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.076	0.114	0.061	0.076

**Panel B: Reaching for Yield**

	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub> (%)					
	High-yield			Investment-grade		
	All	High-stale	Low-stale	All	High-stale	Low-stale
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}$	2.383***	1.849***	2.329**	0.639**	0.678***	0.324
	(0.764)	(0.663)	(0.893)	(0.298)	(0.229)	(0.227)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	41,014	18,427	22,294	85,914	38,252	47,064
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.072	0.066	0.071	0.100	0.079	0.114

**Table A3: Heterogeneous Tests for Monetary Policy and Corporate Bond Fund Outflows.** This table examines the impact of monetary policy changes on fund flows of corporate bond mutual funds across various subsamples using daily data. In both panels, the dependent variable is the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within a window of (-5,-1], where 0 represents the date of the FOMC meeting.  $\Delta\text{FFTar}_{[-1,1]}$  measures the predicted FFTar change, in percentage points, within the [-1,1] window around the FOMC meeting using  $\Delta\text{Eurodollar}(\tau + 5, -5]$ . Panel A compares institutional funds to retail funds in columns 1 and 2, and index funds to non-index funds in columns 3 and 4. Panel B focuses on disentangling the reaching for yield alternative. High-yield funds are those with Lipper objective codes as "HY," CRSP objective codes as "ICQY," Wiesenberger objective codes as "CHY," and Strategic Insight objective codes as "CHY," while the remaining funds are categorized as investment-grade funds. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)staleness funds. The macro controls,  $\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$ , include the change in the Baa-Aaa Spread, the change in the spread between the 30-year and 1-year Treasury yields, and the logarithmic change in the VIX index. Fund characteristics encompass the previous month's performance, return, TNA on a logarithmic scale, expense ratio, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and a high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by the previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: High-Staleness Corporate Bond Funds								
	High-yield Funds				Investment-grade Funds			
	$\Delta NAV_{i(\tau+5,-5]}$ (1)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-5,-1]}$ (2)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-1,5]}$ (3)	$\Delta NAV_{i(5,15]}$ (4)	$\Delta NAV_{i(\tau+5,-5]}$ (5)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-5,-1]}$ (6)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-1,5]}$ (7)	$\Delta NAV_{i(5,15]}$ (8)
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-2.405** (0.969)	-1.296** (0.595)			-2.001** (0.890)	-0.700** (0.341)		
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$			-1.963** (0.757)				-0.947* (0.489)	
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,5]}$				1.651** (0.688)				-0.538 (0.495)
Controls $_{i,t-1}^F$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	22,289	22,289	22,941	22,470	47,507	47,503	49,126	48,467
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.045	0.048	0.038	0.043	0.096	0.101	0.064	0.053

Panel B: Low-Staleness Corporate Bond Funds								
	High-yield Funds				Investment-grade Funds			
	$\Delta NAV_{i(\tau+5,-5]}$ (1)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-5,-1]}$ (2)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-1,5]}$ (3)	$\Delta NAV_{i(5,15]}$ (4)	$\Delta NAV_{i(\tau+5,-5]}$ (5)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-5,-1]}$ (6)	$\Delta NAV_{i(-1,5]}$ (7)	$\Delta NAV_{i(5,15]}$ (8)
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-5.885** (2.431)	-2.922** (1.202)			-1.606* (0.841)	-0.575 (0.471)		
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$			-2.071 (1.306)				-0.883 (0.691)	
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,5]}$				-0.268 (1.107)				-0.445 (0.556)
Controls $_{i,t-1}^F$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	27,157	27,152	28,246	27,969	58,090	58,081	60,153	59,096
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.068	0.018	-0.006	0.019	0.007	-0.001	-0.011

**Table A4: NAV Changes around FOMC Meetings.** This table compares the responsiveness of fund NAVs to market information on monetary policy changes around FOMC meetings for high-yield versus investment-grade funds, separately for high-staleness funds in Panel A and low-staleness funds in Panel B. The dependent variables are the logarithmic changes in NAV for each fund share  $i$  within four different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , with 0 representing the date of the FOMC meeting, and  $\tau$  indicating the date of the previous FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates is measured within the respective windows. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)staleness funds. High-yield funds are those with Lipper objective codes as "HY," CRSP objective codes as "ICQY," Wiesenberger objective codes as "CHY," and Strategic Insight objective codes as "CHY," while the remaining funds are categorized as investment-grade funds. We also include one-year lagged fund characteristics, such as the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and high-yield fund indicator, as controls, denoted as Controls $_{i,t-1}^F$ . Each observation is weighted by the previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>(-5,-1]</sub>		OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>(-1,5]</sub>		OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>(5,15]</sub>	
	High-stale (1)	Low-stale (2)	High-stale (3)	Low-stale (4)	High-stale (5)	Low-stale (6)
$\Delta$ Eurodollar <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-5]</math></sub>	0.769** (0.329)	0.453 (0.389)				
$\Delta$ Eurodollar <sub><i>i</i>(<math>\tau+5,-1]</math></sub>			1.453** (0.615)	0.844 (0.578)		
$\Delta$ Eurodollar <sub><i>i</i>(<math>\tau+5,5]</math></sub>					0.190 (0.495)	0.456 (0.539)
1Y Yield	-0.081 (0.061)	-0.081 (0.070)	-0.008 (0.106)	-0.136 (0.133)	-0.013 (0.098)	-0.218 (0.168)
30Y-1Y Spread	-0.102** (0.040)	-0.105** (0.048)	-0.047 (0.071)	-0.179* (0.097)	-0.204*** (0.069)	-0.290*** (0.109)
Baa-Aaa-Spread	-0.116 (0.097)	-0.167 (0.118)	-0.071 (0.157)	-0.363** (0.169)	-0.226 (0.185)	-0.536** (0.205)
VIX	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.017)	0.008 (0.018)
Controls <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	56,679	69,358	56,673	69,381	55,271	67,778
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.111	0.097	0.113	0.125	0.137

**Table A5: Monetary-policy-induced Fragility: Monetary Policy Changes versus Reaching for Yield** This table examines whether return predictability can explain monetary-policy-induced fragility around FOMC meetings. The dependent variables are the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within three different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , where 0 represents the date of the FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates is measured within the respective windows  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(\tau+5,-1]$ , and  $(\tau+5,5]$ , where  $\tau$  indicates the date of the previous FOMC meeting. Return Forecast $(\tau+5,-5]$  represents the forecasted 5-day return for fund  $i$  using daily return data within the window  $(\tau+5,-5]$ . Similarly, Return Forecast $(\tau+5,-1]$  and Return Forecast $(\tau+5,5]$  represent the forecasted 5-day returns for fund  $i$  using daily return data within the windows  $(\tau+5,-1]$  and  $(\tau+5,5]$ , respectively. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. 1Y yield is one-year Treasury yield, Baa-Aaa spread is the yield difference between Bbb- and Aaa-rated corporate bonds, and 30Y-1Y spread is the difference between the 30-year and 1-year Treasury yields. Controls<sub>*i,t-1*</sub><sup>F</sup> are one-year lagged fund characteristics, including the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub>		OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-1,5]</sub>		OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(5,15]</sub>	
	High-stale (1)	Low-stale (2)	High-stale (3)	Low-stale (4)	High-stale (5)	Low-stale (6)
$\Delta$ Eurodollar <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-5]</math></sub>	1.015*** (0.243)	0.433 (0.307)				
Return Forecast <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-5]</math></sub>	-0.349*** (0.130)	-0.310*** (0.101)				
$\Delta$ Eurodollar <sub><i>i</i>,(<math>\tau+5,-1]</math></sub>			1.555*** (0.451)	0.599 (0.468)		
Return Forecast <sub>(<math>\tau+5,-1]</math></sub>			-0.699*** (0.183)	-0.473*** (0.173)		
$\Delta$ Eurodollar <sub><i>i</i>,(<math>\tau+5,5]</math></sub>					0.744* (0.415)	0.626 (0.477)
Return Forecast <sub><i>i</i>,(<math>\tau+5,5]</math></sub>					-0.591*** (0.184)	-0.396** (0.158)
Controls <sub><i>i</i>,<math>t-1</math></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	52,216	63,691	54,547	66,625	55,269	67,764
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.086	0.115	0.104	0.112	0.112	0.122

**Table A6: Monetary-policy-induced Fragility: Monetary Policy Changes versus Predicted Returns** This table examines whether return predictability can explain monetary-policy-induced fragility around FOMC meetings. The dependent variables are the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within three different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , where 0 represents the date of the FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates is measured within the respective windows  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(\tau+5,-1]$ , and  $(\tau+5,5]$ , where  $\tau$  indicates the date of the previous FOMC meeting. Return Forecast $(\tau+5,-5]$  represents the forecasted 5-day return for fund  $i$  using daily return data within the window  $(\tau+5,-5]$ . Similarly, Return Forecast $(\tau+5,-1]$  and Return Forecast<sub>( $\tau+5,5]$</sub>  represent the forecasted 5-day returns for fund  $i$  using daily return data within the windows  $(\tau+5,-1]$  and  $(\tau+5,5]$ , respectively. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. Controls<sub>*i*, $t-1$</sub> <sup>F</sup> are one-year lagged fund characteristics, including the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

**Panel A: Treasuries Bond Funds**

	$\Delta NAV_{i,(\tau+5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-1,5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(5,15]}$	
	High-state (1)	Low-state (2)	High-state (3)	Low-state (4)	High-state (5)	Low-state (6)	High-state (7)	Low-state (8)
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-0.712*** (0.254)	0.626 (1.724)	-0.145 (0.105)	0.157 (0.769)				
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$			-0.032 (0.231)	0.859 (1.399)				
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,5]}$			-0.347 (0.221)	-1.726* (0.949)				
Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,918	2,445	1,918	2,445	1,994	2,548	1,974	2,511
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.001	0.020	-0.008	0.024	-0.010	0.007	0.0003

**Panel B: Equity Funds**

	$\Delta NAV_{i,(\tau+5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-5,-1]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(-1,5]}$		$\Delta NAV_{i,(5,15]}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	-4.638 (4.763)	-2.151 (3.309)						
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,-1]}$			-5.904* (3.492)					
$\Delta Eurodollar_{(\tau+5,5]}$			-1.247 (3.662)					
Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	573,510	573,405	594,040	594,382	594,040	594,382	594,382	594,382
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	-0.003	0.020	-0.007	0.020	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007

**Table A7: NAV Changes around FOMC Meetings for Treasury Bond Funds and Equity Funds.** This table compares the responsiveness of fund NAV's to market information on monetary policy changes around FOMC meetings for Treasury bond funds (Panel A) versus equity funds (Panel B). Treasury funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. We do not distinguish non-stale v.s. stale equity funds, as around 66% of observations have zero proportion of non-moving NAV days before meetings. The dependent variables are the logarithmic changes in NAV for each fund share  $i$  within four different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(\tau+5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , with 0 representing the date of the FOMC meeting, and  $\tau$  indicating the date of the previous FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates is measured within the respective windows. We also include one-year lagged fund characteristics, such as the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and high-yield fund indicator, as controls, denoted as Controls $^F_{i,t-1}$ . Each observation is weighted by previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

<b>Panel A: Treasuries Bond Funds</b>						
	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub>		OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-1,5]</sub>		OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(5,15]</sub>	
	High-stale (1)	Low-stale (2)	High-stale (3)	Low-stale (4)	High-stale (5)	Low-stale (6)
$\Delta\text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	2.141 (1.709)	-1.517 (1.688)				
$\Delta\text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,-1]}$			8.278 (5.499)	0.548 (0.903)		
$\Delta\text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,5]}$					6.992* (3.787)	-1.838 (1.797)
Controls <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,336	1,450	1,341	1,463	1,311	1,417
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.027	0.013	0.001	-0.025	0.037	-0.006

<b>Panel B: Equity Funds</b>			
	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-5,-1]</sub>	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(-1,5]</sub>	OutFlows <sub><i>i</i>,(5,15]</sub>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta\text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,-5]}$	0.378 (0.307)		
$\Delta\text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,-1]}$		0.295 (0.338)	
$\Delta\text{Eurodollar}_{(\tau+5,5]}$			-0.144 (0.252)
Controls <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> <sup>F</sup>	✓	✓	✓
Fund FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	462,243	462,349	447,572
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.056	0.070

**Table A8: Fund Outflows around FOMC Meetings for Treasury Bond Funds and Equity Funds.** This table examines how fund flows respond to market information regarding monetary policy changes around FOMC meetings for Treasury bond funds (Panel A) versus equity funds (Panel B). Treasury funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. We do not distinguish non-stale v.s. stale equity funds, as around 66% of observations have zero proportion of non-moving NAV days before meetings. The dependent variables are the cumulative fund outflows, measured in percentage points, for each fund share  $i$  within three different time windows around FOMC meetings:  $(-5,-1]$ ,  $(-1,5]$ , and  $(5,15]$ , where 0 represents the date of the FOMC meeting. For each time window, the information revealed by the Eurodollar Future rates is measured within the respective windows  $(\tau+5,-5]$ ,  $(\tau+5,-1]$ , and  $(\tau+5,5]$ , where  $\tau$  indicates the date of the previous FOMC meeting. Funds that exhibit a higher (lower) proportion of non-moving NAV days in the non-FOMC window leading up to the preceding FOMC meeting, compared to the median, are classified as high-(low-)stale funds. The interaction terms measure the difference in the outflow-rate relationship between high-stale and low-stale funds. Controls<sub>*i,t-1*</sub><sup>F</sup> are one-year lagged fund characteristics, including the total net asset in log scale, expense ratios, percentage of cash and government bond holding, and high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by previous year's end-of-year fund TNA. Standard errors are clustered at each FOMC meeting and the fund share level. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

	OutFlow <sub><i>i,m</i></sub> (%) in Months with FOMC meetings				All
	High-staleness Funds	Low-staleness Funds			
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$	1.185***	0.799**	0.708**	0.236	0.236
	(0.285)	(0.335)	(0.355)	(0.344)	(0.344)
$\Delta\text{FFTar}_m \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High-stale})$					0.563*
					(0.296)
$\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\text{Controls}_{i,t-1}^F$		✓		✓	✓
Fund FE		✓		✓	✓
Observations	166,589	115,036	171,743	116,167	231,203
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.093	0.015	0.094	0.093

**Table A9: Monetary Policy-Induced Fragility(Monthly Evidence).** This table examines the impact of monetary policy changes on fund flows of corporate bond mutual funds from January 1992 to December 2019. Only months with FOMC meetings are included in the analysis. The table studies the outflow-rate relationship for high-staleness funds (columns 1-2), low-staleness funds (columns 3-4), and the interaction effect (column 5). High-staleness (low-staleness) funds are identified as those with a proportion of non-moving NAV days in the previous month higher (lower) than the top (bottom) tercile within each Lipper objective category. OutFlow<sub>*i,m*</sub> represents the outflow of fund share *i* in month *m*, and  $\Delta\text{FFTar}_m$  denotes the percentage point changes in FFTar. The macro controls,  $\Delta\text{Controls}_m^M$ , include the change in the Baa-Aaa Spread, the change in the spread between the 30-year and 1-year Treasury yields, and the logarithmic change in the VIX index. Fund characteristics encompass the previous month's performance, return, TNA on a logarithmic scale, expense ratio, percentage of cash and government bond holdings, and a high-yield fund indicator. Each observation is weighted by the TNA value of the fund from the previous month. Coefficients (standard errors) are reported in shaded (unshaded) rows. Standard errors are clustered at the fund share and month levels. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.